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Abstract: 
 Arguments from underdetermination take two forms, those from global sceptical 
underdetermination, global scientific underdetermination and local underdetermination. 
Arguments from global sceptical underdetermination bring into question all knowledge, 
they develop sceptical scenarios that purport to show that we cannot trust any 
„knowledge‟ that we obtain within the world. Arguments from local underdetermination 
aim to bring into question the nature of our knowledge and are geared against scientific 
realism. This thesis is an evaluation of the arguments that claim to do the latter, however 
it shows that these arguments are not arguments from local underdetermination but are 
from a type of global underdetermination that I call global scientific underdetermination. 
Based on this evaluation a new argument from local underdetermination is developed that 
attempts to show that nevertheless local underdetermination is indeed a problem for 
scientific realism. However, I argue that this argument also fails to undermine scientific 
realism. Recently Kyle Stanford has reintroduced an historical argument from 
underdetermination that he calls the argument from unconceived alternatives. Stanford‟s 
argument from unconceived alternatives is an inductive historical argument. It maintains 
that scientific theories are chosen from a non-exhaustive set of theories; claiming there is 
always at least one unconceived alternative that would better explain the empirical 
evidence. Stanford‟s new induction attempts to undermine scientific realism by arguing 
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that our most successful theories will eventually be shown to be false. Various arguments 
against this induction will be considered. It will be shown that traditional scientific 
realism fails to address the argument from unconceived alternatives and the only form of 
scientific realism that can overcome this problem is structural realism. 
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Introduction: 
Scientific realism is the epistemological thesis that we know that our current most 
successful scientific theories are true or at least approximately true.  The criteria for a 
true theory, according to scientific realism, are that it is successful in its predictions and 
descriptions of reality. Conversely, scientific antirealism maintains that we can never 
know that a scientific theory is approximately true.  An obvious question arises from 
this denial: what then does science do if it does not get at the truth?  There are many 
different answers to this question given by scientific antirealists.  The pragmatist for 
example explains that a central goal of science is usefulness, for a scientific theory to be 
successful it must be useful. To be useful a scientific theory must make some useful 
predictions or be applicable to technological advancements.  In order to argue against 
the scientific realist, the antirealist employs two lines of reasoning that support her 
position and cast doubt on the scientific realists‟ claim that we can know when our 
scientific theories are approximately true.  The main goal of the antirealist then is to 
show that we do not know that certain elements of our theories are true.  To do this 
some antirealists utilize the history of science to show that successful theories of the past 
which were once held to be true are in fact false and thus since those theories are in fact 
false, our current most successful theories are as well.  This argumentative approach is 
called the pessimistic induction since it is an inductive argument developed from the 
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history of philosophy and is applicable to all our most successful theories. Another type 
of historical argument is called the argument from unconceived alternatives, this 
argument maintains that not only does the history of science show that our scientific 
theories are false, but they are also in a constant state of underdetermination, empirical 
equivalence, with at least one current unconceived alternative theory that has yet to be 
developed. Another approach utilizes case studies or theories generated by philosophers 
to show that our current most successful theories are not true because other theories exist 
or can easily be developed that are just as empirically well confirmed as those theories 
we hold to be true. The theories utilized in these case studies are underdetermined and 
thus this argumentative approach is called the antirealist argument from 
underdetermination. For two or more theories to be underdetermined they must be 
empirically equivalent. That is to say they must be supported by the same empirical 
evidence and thus are empirically equivalent. 
 According to the current philosophical literature there are two types of antirealist 
arguments from underdetermination, global underdetermination and local 
underdetermination.
1
 The goal of global underdetermination is to call into question all 
knowledge; an example of this type of underdetermination is the Cartesian Demon 
argument according to which “some malicious demon of the utmost power and cunning 
has employed all his energies in order to deceive [us]…external things are merely 
delusions of dreams which he has devised to ensnare [our] judgments” (Descartes, 1996, 
                                                          
1
 I will later distinguish between two types of global underdetermination, global sceptical 
underdetermination and global scientific underdetermination. 
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15). The underdetermination arises when we compare this thesis, which tells us that we 
are being deceived, to the commonsensical thesis that the world exists as our perceptions 
tell us it does. No amount of evidence will ever allow us to distinguish between the thesis 
of deception and the thesis of correct perception. Any evidence found to verify one of 
these theses will just as easily verify the other. The empirical evidence that makes me 
believe that I am sitting in my office right now, the sight of my computer in front of me, 
the feeling of my backrest against my back, the feel of the keyboard under my fingers, the 
sound of other graduate students in the hall, corroborates the claim that I am actually 
sitting in my office and thus corroborates the thesis of correct perception, but it does not 
block the sceptical move outlined within the thesis of deception. The Cartesian sceptic 
can just as easily explain that the malicious demon is giving me all the sensations that 
make me believe I am in my office. No matter how much evidence I provide towards the 
claim that I am in my office right now, that the world actually does exist, I will never be 
able to conclusively show that I do indeed exist in the real world rather than in some 
illusory world created by the Cartesian demon; thus, since no amount of evidence will 
ever be able to distinguish between the real world and the world created by the Cartesian 
demon, these two theses are said to be globally underdetermined.  Due to the sceptical 
nature of these types of scenarios and the scope of the argument‟s scepticism, I have 
deemed this type of argument a case of global sceptical underdetermination. It is argued 
that if these arguments show that we cannot rely upon our everyday experience and thus 
all knowledge fails, then we know that our current most successful theories are false. 
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 The second type of underdetermination discussed in the philosophical literature, 
local underdetermination, calls into question scientific knowledge. More specifically it is 
a direct challenge against scientific realism. This type of underdetermination claims that 
we cannot know that our current most successful theories are true, for an alternative 
theory exists or can be developed that is empirically equivalent to each of our most 
successful scientific theories. According to these arguments, given these two or more 
underdetermined theories, there are no truth-indicating reasons to guide our choice 
between two theories which have the same supporting evidence. An example of this type 
of underdetermination comes from the debate between Leibniz and Newton concerning 
absolute space. From Newtonian mechanics we can generate a different but empirically 
equivalent theory, that is, one that makes the same predictions and describes all the same 
phenomena, observable events, in the universe in the same manner. The only difference 
in the second theory is that according to it the universe is in motion relative to absolute 
space, while Newtonian theory says that the universe is at rest relative to absolute space.  
No amount of empirical data can distinguish between these two distinct theories, thus 
they are underdetermined by any available evidence. I will argue that, following 
Stanford, the current philosophical literature that develops antirealist arguments from 
local underdetermination generates empirically equivalent theories that are in principle 
indistinguishable. As a result these arguments are not arguments from local 
underdetermination, but from global underdetermination. Since theories that are not in 
principle empirically distinguishable are globally underdetermined it follows that for two 
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or more theories to be locally underdetermined they must be empirically distinguishable 
in principle. This means that locally underdetermined theories are empirically equivalent, 
but given enough empirical evidence the theories can eventually be distinguished; they 
are empirically equivalent based on the amount of empirical evidence available at the 
time. 
 One approach within the literature that attempts to develop an argument from 
local underdetermination examines cases of empirical equivalence in contemporary 
science. However, it will be shown that even this approach has failed for the case studies 
examined are cases of global underdetermination rather than local underdetermination.
 2
 
In order to make the antirealist argument from underdetermination as strong as possible, I 
will develop a new argument from local underdetermination that I call the new general 
argument which effectively challenges scientific realism. Once this new argument is 
constructed, I will provide a means of rectifying scientific realism from this argument. 
This will effectively show that scientific realism is correct, that we can know when our 
scientific theories are true. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2
 In order to distinguish between global sceptical underdetermination that questions all knowledge and this 
type of global underdetermination that focuses only on scientific knowledge, we will refer to the latter type as 
global scientific underdetermination. 
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Chapter 1: Determining Underdetermination 
1.1 Assessing the Threat: Underdetermination in the literature 
Global Underdetermination 
 Within the philosophical literature there are two types of underdetermination 
utilized in producing arguments from underdetermination, global underdetermination and 
local underdetermination. As was discussed above, an example of global sceptical 
underdetermination is the Cartesian demon argument, “where there might be an all 
powerful „Evil Demon‟ who devotes all his energies to deceiving us about what the world 
is really like” (Stanford, 12). No amount of evidence can distinguish between a world 
controlled by the Evil Demon and one that is not. Another example of global 
underdetermination is presented by the dream argument, in which Descartes discusses the 
differences between experiences while dreaming versus experiences while awake; he 
states that “there are never any sure signs by means of which being awake can be 
distinguished from being asleep” (1996, p. 13). If one day I were to fall asleep and have a 
vivid and complex dream, one which begins with my waking up from falling asleep I 
would never be able to distinguish between my waking life and my dream life. I would 
never be able to find enough evidence in my dream life to ascertain that I was in fact 
dreaming. Arguments from global underdetermination, then, are sceptical in nature as 
they bring into question both our possession of any knowledge and the nature of what we 
perceive to be the real world is brought into question. 
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 Even if the examples of global underdetermination are correct, we can still 
proceed with academic and scientific enquiry. For even if the world is a construct within 
a computer program into which we are plugged, or a figment of a demonic imagination, it 
is the world within which we „reside‟ and as such we can make empirical observations 
about that world that allow us to function within it and better understand it. We can make 
predictions of what will „happen‟ in the world. The claim that we live in a computer or 
demon controlled world does not negate the knowledge that we have of that world, 
whether it is simulated or real. Our knowledge allows us to manipulate the world that we 
live in, whether by curing diseases, creating technology or other advancements. Thus, 
even if the world that we live in is a simulated world, it is clear that our scientific theories 
can be at least approximately true. This idea stems from Rudolf Carnap‟s philosophical 
position on linguistics and abstract entities, discussed in his paper “Empiricism, 
Semantics, and Ontology”. Carnap argues that we can understand abstract entities, such 
as numbers, from within the framework established by our use of the language and the 
theories of these abstract numbers. Thus we can talk about abstract entities from within 
the framework, asking questions that are internal to the framework, even though from 
within a framework we cannot ask question about the framework, “questions concerning 
the existence or reality of the system of entities as a whole, called external questions” 
(20). Similarly, I am suggesting that in the face of global scepticism bnwe can ask 
internal questions. Internal questions lead to knowledge about the world from within the 
framework, i.e. from within the world, regardless of whether the world is demon created 
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or as we believe it to be and we can ask external questions about the world itself, i.e. 
sceptical questions about the reality of the world
3
. Asking external questions about the 
underlying reality as the Cartesian demon argument does not undermine our knowledge 
established from within the system it only casts doubt on its status of knowledge. 
 Furthermore, it seems we can cast doubt on the creativity of the programmer of 
the computer simulated world, or the demon, for the creator of the simulation would base 
the physical laws of the simulated world on his real world rather than generating a world 
that operates on completely different physical laws. The imagination of the creator would 
be limited by her knowledge and since her knowledge is based on the world in which she 
lives, thus our world, the simulated world, would be similar to her world. Thus, the 
knowledge that we can obtain in the system of the simulation can be applied to the real 
world, the world of the programmer or the demon. If a person were to somehow escape 
the simulated world and enter the real world, it seems unlikely that they would not be 
able to function in the real world. The knowledge that this person had obtained in the 
simulated world would be applicable to the real world, for the simulated world would in 
some way have to be based on the real world. Furthermore, the simulated world would 
have to be compatible with the physiology of the captive‟s brain. It would be a world that 
could be experienced through the five senses since the brain is hard wired to interpret the 
stimuli that is received through our sense receptors. Thus, the possible nature of the 
                                                          
3
 The distinction between external and internal questions is the only element which I wish to draw from 
Carnap‟s discussion. 
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simulated world would be restricted by our physiology and the imagination of the creator 
of that world. 
 Even if the creator of the simulation is somehow able to construct a world that is 
fundamentally different than the real world, the knowledge that we obtain in the 
simulation works within the constructed world. Thus, arguments from global 
underdetermination do not bring into question our scientific knowledge if we consider 
our knowledge within the system itself
4
. We have knowledge if we consider the closed 
system only. The second type of underdetermination, local underdetermination seeks to 
undermine scientific realism. More specifically the argument from local 
underdetermination seeks to undermine the philosophical position of scientific realism. 
The terms global and local refer to the extent that our knowledge claims are challenged. 
The term local indicates that only our scientific knowledge claims are challenged. The 
term global indicates that all our knowledge claims are challenged. Furthermore, cases of 
local underdetermination can eventually be resolved, whereas global underdetermination 
cannot be resolved. Thus an antirealist argument from local underdetermination ought to 
utilize genuine scientific cases where two or more theories are underdetermined such that 
they can eventually be resolved. Furthermore, such an argument ought to show why local 
underdetermination is a potential problem for scientific realism, the philosophical 
position that states that we can know that our most successful theories are approximately 
true. 
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 Assuming there are no other problems with the way we generate scientific beliefs. 
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Local Underdetermination 
 Within the contemporary philosophical literature that develops the argument from 
underdetermination, there are three strategies for producing a general argument from 
what the authors perceive as local underdetermination.
5
 The three strategies are the 
algorithmic approach, the pessimistic induction approach and lastly an approach that 
utilizes case studies of underdetermination in science. These strategies will be considered 
in full and it will be shown that they are insufficient in producing a strong general 
argument from local underdetermination. The algorithmic approach fails to produce a 
general argument from local underdetermination; it merely instead reformulates the 
sceptical arguments of global underdetermination. The pessimistic induction approach 
produces a strong anti-realist argument; however it is an argument that focuses on the 
falsification of past theories and not underdetermination. The approach that utilizes case 
studies of underdetermination in science to produce a general argument looks most 
promising; however the contemporary literature either utilizes cases of global 
underdetermination or uses historical cases which only serve to produce inductive 
arguments. The goal of this chapter then is to evaluate each strategy of producing an 
argument from local underdetermination. It will be shown that each strategy fails to 
produce and to constitute an argument from local underdetermination, but instead 
produces a type of global underdetermination that I call global scientific 
                                                          
5
 See Earman 1993, Psillos 2009 and Stanford 2006. 
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underdetermination. Based on this evaluation I construct a new argument from local 
underdetermination from the most promising strategy. I then show that 
underdetermination is a problem for scientific realism, because given empirically 
equivalent theories we cannot know which theory is true or even approximately true. 
The Algorithmic Approach 
 The algorithmic approach has been developed to produce alternatives to our most 
successful theories. These algorithms allegedly allow philosophers to generate an 
empirically equivalent theory to any theory at all
6
. A good example of this approach is 
called the TN (Newtonian Theory) approach (Earman, 1993, 31). The class of TN theses 
utilize Newtonian mechanics and gravitational theory, including the concept of absolute 
space. TN(o) states that the universe is at rest with relation to absolute space, while 
TN(v) states that the universe is in motion relative to absolute space, where v is the 
velocity of the universe. There can never be any empirical observations that will allow 
scientists to distinguish between these two theories. Therefore, TN(v) is empirically 
equivalent to TN(o). This example of course utilizes a physical theory that is out of date; 
however the advocates of this algorithm maintain that similar algorithms can be 
generated to produce empirically equivalent theories for other scientific theories. 
 André Kukla for example proposes “an algorithm for constructing indefinitely 
many empirical equivalents to any theory” (Kukla 1993, 1). He constructs this general 
algorithm from considering a specific case of empirical equivalence. Following 
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 „Algorithm‟ is used in a very general, nonmathematical, sense here. 
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Goodman, Kukla begins by defining something that is grue as something that is green 
when observed and blue if it is not observed.  Thus based on this definition of grue, the 
theory that states all emeralds are green is empirically equivalent to the theory that states 
that all emeralds are grue. “Furthermore, the equivalence will survive any conceivable 
change in the range of observables and auxiliaries” (Kukla 1993, 4). This approach can 
be generalized in the following way, we can take any theory T with a specific 
observational consequence O and construct a theory T  where T is true only when the 
universe is being observed, but while no observation is taking place the universe follows 
the laws of T . Kukla then concludes that “one can find such a T  for any T, and just as 
clearly, T  is empirically equivalent to T” (1993, 5). Kukla admits that this construction 
might be a logico-semantic trick and that he does not claim that T  theories are genuine 
competitor to T theories (Kukla, 1993, 5); however his main point is that its rejection has 
to be argued for. He believes that the algorithmic approach shows “that there [are] 
empirically equivalent propositional structures to any theory. The only question is 
whether these structures fail to satisfy some additional criteria for genuine theoreticity” 
(Kukla 1993, his italics, 5). 
 Stanford (2006) in Exceeding our Grasp provides the means to refute this type of 
empirical equivalence when he disagrees with the TN approach. He states that TN(v) and 
TN(o) do not make identical empirical predictions (2006, p. 13). The very thesis of TN(o) 
implies that no empirical evidence can be found for the claim of absolute rest, while the 
argument from underdetermination applies to claims that can possibly be empirically 
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verified. As Stanford explains “the TN(v) variety pose no threat to the approximate truth 
of our theories: if the realist believes TN(o) when…TN(v) obtains, most of her theoretical 
beliefs about the relevant domain will be straightforwardly true” (p. 14). All that TN(v) 
shows is that we would be unjustified to hold any belief concerning the velocity of the 
universe in relation to space and therefore does not pose a real challenge to scientific 
realism. Stanford rightly points out that the algorithm used to produce the TN argument 
does not produce a case of local underdetermination, but a case of global scientific 
underdetermination. No amount of empirical evidence will ever be able to distinguish 
between TN(o) and TN(v) and therefore this example of the algorithmic approach fails. 
This argument can also be applied to Kukla‟s algorithm. TN(o) and TN(v) imply that no 
empirical evidence can be found for the relative velocity of the universe to absolute 
space, while the argument from underdetermination applies to claims that can be 
empirically verified. All that the T  variety of theories shows is that we can never be 
justified in asserting certain properties, such as relative velocity of the universe to 
absolute space or the color of emeralds when not observed, since no amount of evidence 
will enable scientists to distinguish between a theory that asserts this special property and 
one that does not. Thus Kukla‟s algorithm produces a sceptical, global scientific 
underdetermination, argument of philosophical interest only and misses the mark of local 
underdetermination in science. 
 More generally, the algorithmic approach involves ad hoc adjustments to bring 
about underdetermination and the theories that it produces need not be taken seriously by 
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philosophers or scientists. These ad hoc adjustments through the use of algorithms 
generated by philosophers cannot make short work of the task of producing genuinely 
distinct empirically equivalent theories. The procedure of producing genuinely distinct 
empirically equivalent theories is exactly what most theoretical scientists attempt to do 
over the course of their careers (Stanford, 15). It follows then that rather than producing 
empirically equivalent rivals to scientific theories using algorithms, philosophers ought to 
defer to the history of science for examples. Within the available philosophical literature, 
the pessimistic induction approach comes closest to utilizing an examination of the 
history of science in the above sense. 
The Pessimistic Induction 
 The pessimistic induction states that, since the history of science shows that past 
successful theories, which were once thought to be true, have almost always turned out to 
be false, it follows that some of our current theories must be false as well and that we are 
not in a position to know when our theories are true. As Larry Laudan explains, 
“scientific theories of earlier eras exhibited an impressive sort of empirical support, 
arguably no different in kind from that enjoyed by many contemporary physical theories. 
Yet we now believe that many of those earlier theories profoundly mischaracterized the 
way the world was” (Laudan, 1984, 157). For example, before the Eddington eclipse 
experiment in 1919, Newtonian Physics had as much empirically evidence supporting it 
as the general theory of relativity. Both theories provided explanation for all the available 
evidence, until Eddington and his team during an eclipse observed that the light from a 
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star behind our sun was bent around the sun in the manner predicted by Einstein‟s general 
theory of relativity, thereby proving that Einstein‟s theory was true and Newton‟s theory 
was false. Thus, even though Newton‟s theory was once held to be a successful theory, a 
new theory eventually emerged that was at one time empirically equivalent to Newtonian 
mechanics and in the end Newtonian mechanics was proven to be false. Several other 
examples can be found within the history of science, including the transition from the 
Ptolemaic earth centered universe theory to the Copernican theory and from Aristotelian 
Mechanics to Newtonian Mechanics (for more examples see Stanford 2006, 20). From 
these examples the pessimistic induction strategy for an argument from 
underdetermination states that since past successful theories have so often been shown to 
be false it follows that our current successful theories will also eventually and inevitably 
be shown to be false. Thus even our current and most successful scientific theories cannot 
be true and thus scientific realism is incorrect. 
 The pessimistic induction is not an argument from underdetermination, it is an 
inductive argument. For even though the falsification of one theory and the verification of 
another is often the result of two theories being underdetermined, underdetermination is 
not the main focus of the pessimistic induction, rather it is the falsification of the earlier 
successful theory that is the main element of this particular antirealist argument. An 
argument from local underdetermination ought to use two or more theories that are 
underdetermined based on the current available evidence to show that scientific realism is 
incorrect. The pessimistic induction does not focus on the issue of underdetermination, it 
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instead uses historical cases of theory change in order to inductively conclude that our 
current theories are not true. Thus, the pessimistic induction is a strong antirealist 
challenge against scientific realism however it is an argument from induction, not an 
argument from underdetermination. 
Unconceived Alternatives 
 Based on the pessimistic induction, Stanford rejuvenates another inductive 
argument from the history of science, called, following Duhem, the problem of 
unconceived alternatives (2006). Stanford maintains that through the history of science 
we have often occupied an epistemic position in which we have conceived of only one or 
a few theories that were empirically well confirmed, even though further inquiry would 
produce distinct alternatives that were empirically equivalent. Stanford states that “in the 
historical progression from Aristotelian to Cartesian to Newtonian to contemporary 
mechanical theories, the evidence available at the time each earlier theory was accepted 
offered equally strong support to each of the (then-unimagined) later alternatives” (2006, 
p. 19). For example, long before the general theory of relativity was even imagined by 
Einstein as a possible alternative, the empirical evidence that established Newtonian 
Mechanics as the most successful theory would also have supported the general theory of 
relativity. Stanford then lists over half a dozen more examples which he believes 
“suffices to illustrate that the pattern is characteristic of theoretical science across a wide 
variety of fields and historical circumstances” (Stanford, 20). Therefore, the history of 
science offers evidence for the claim that empirically equivalent alternatives with respect 
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to available evidence for our best theories could be formulated, even if we have not been 
able to conceive of them at the time. If unconceived empirically equivalent alternatives to 
our best theories do exist then there is no way to justify belief in our current theories. As 
a consequence we cannot be confident that a theory is true, because that theory could 
have been developed, bases on inference to the best explanation, from a set of theories 
that did not include the theory that will eventually supersede it.
7
 
A strength of the argument from unconceived alternatives is that unlike the 
theories generated by the algorithmic approach, all the theories under consideration in it 
are serious scientific possibilities. As with the pessimistic induction, the argument from 
unconceived alternatives calls into question the truth of our best and most successful 
theories. However, as Stanford notes, “the classical pessimistic induction notes simply 
that past successful theories have turned out to be false and suggests we have no reason to 
think that our present successful theories will not suffer the same fate” (2006, 19). The 
argument from unconceived alternatives states that throughout the history of every 
scientific discipline, we have “repeatedly occupied an epistemic position in which we 
could conceive of only one or a few theories that were well confirmed by the available 
evidence, while subsequent inquiry would routinely (if not invariably) reveal further, 
radically distinct alternatives” (2006, 19). These alternatives would be as well confirmed 
by the available evidence as our current most successful theories and thus they would be 
empirically equivalent relative to the empirical evidence available at the time. Thus, 
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 For a further discussion of unconceived alternatives see chapter 3. 
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while the pessimistic induction questions the accuracy of our most successful theories 
based on the historical characteristics of science, unconceived alternatives questions the 
accuracy of our most successful theories based on the amount of competition that they 
have enjoyed since their conception. Stanford‟s argument from unconceived alternatives 
is a strong challenge against the scientific realist, for it shows how difficult it is for 
scientists to come up with all the possible alternatives to any theory, while that theory is 
under development. 
The Case Study Approach 
 The third and final strategy in the literature for constructing an argument from 
underdetermination is the strategy that utilizes cases of underdetermination in science. 
Within the contemporary philosophical literature the majority of examples of 
underdetermination, even those utilizing this strategy, are examples of global scientific 
underdetermination. John Earman says that the lack of real world examples in these 
discussions “is a shortcoming of the philosophical literature and not a failure of the 
underdetermination [argument]” (1993, 31). In response to this shortcoming, Earman 
proposes to find some real world examples of local underdetermination. Earman starts off 
on the wrong foot, however, for his first example is the TN example which I argued is not 
an example of local underdetermination because no amount of evidence will ever enable 
us to distinguish between the TN theory that states that the universe is in motion relative 
to absolute space and the TN theory that states that the universe is at rest relative to 
absolute space. His second example concerns the topological features of space-time. 
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Given our restricted position in space, the observations that are available to us are 
restricted to events within our past light cone. Thus, our position in the universe is such 
that any observations made from Earth are restricted to those stars that we can see and 
thus these observations are not representative of the whole universe, assuming that our 
location in space is atypical. It follows that the observations we can make from our 
position in the universe do not allow us to determine the topological structure of the 
universe. Such topological features include, but are not restricted to, an open or closed 
universe and the compactness of space. As a result we cannot and will never be able to 
empirically distinguish hypotheses about the topological features of space-time. After 
giving these two examples, Earman states that “other examples could be given, but [he 
trusts] enough has been said to remove the worry that the underdetermination thesis….is 
vacuously true…” (Earman, 31). 
 Earman‟s examples fail to establish that the argument from local 
underdetermination is a problem from scientific realism, for his examples establish global 
scientific underdetermination. The topological case also fails to show that local 
underdetermination is an issue in science. No amount of evidence will ever be able to 
distinguish between theories that posit different and distinct topological features of 
space-time, thus the problem of topological features is also a problem of global scientific 
underdetermination. This problem only shows the limitations of a scientific theory, much 
in the same way the TN example does. As with the velocity of the universe relative to 
absolute space in the TN example, the topological structures of space-time do not play a 
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vital role within our most successful theories. Indeed, the general theory of relativity 
allows for many different topological features. For example, in order to make his theory 
fit a static universe, Einstein introduced a constant, called the cosmological constant that 
would counter gravity and keep the universe from contracting or expanding due to this 
dominant force. When Hubble observed that the universe was in fact expanding, Einstein 
called the cosmological constant the greatest blunder of his life. Yet Einstein‟s theory 
was not abandoned; all that was needed to adjust the theory to fit the observation was to 
reduce the cosmological constant to zero; the general theory of relativity was by no 
means falsified (see Goldsmith, 1995 and Kirshner, 2004). Just as Einstein‟s theory of 
general relativity allows for an expanding, contracting or static universe, it can also 
encompass an open or closed universe, all the possible geometries of space and any other 
topological structure that is underdetermined by the available evidence. Therefore, the 
example of the underdetermination of topological structures is of philosophical interest 
only and is not a problem that concerns the truth of our most successful scientific 
theories. In conclusion, Earman‟s example displays the limits of our knowledge rather 
than real world examples of local underdetermination. 
 The argument against global sceptical arguments, such as the Cartesian demon, 
can be extended to Earman‟s example of the topological structure of space-time. As 
Earman has noted, given our position in the universe our observations are restricted to 
events in our past light cone and thus we cannot distinguish between the various 
topological structures. Even if we were on the opposite side of the universe our position 
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would be such that our observations would be so restricted, however within this restricted 
position we can still make observations that allow us to understand and determine the 
characteristics of the universe, including the laws that govern it. Thus as in the Cartesian 
demon sceptical scenario we are doing well epistemologically for we can gain knowledge 
within the system or in this case from our restricted position.  The Cartesian demon 
argument attempts to question the amount of knowledge we can gain, while Earman‟s 
case study shows the limits of our knowledge.  In both cases, we can rightly say we 
have knowledge and we can know which scientific theory is true, thus Earman‟s example 
fails to undermine scientific realism. 
1.2 A New General Argument against Scientific Realism from Local 
Underdetermination 
 Some lessons can be derived from our discussion of the above of the approaches 
utilized to construct an argument from underdetermination. Firstly, an argument from 
underdetermination ought to come from cases of genuinely distinct but empirically 
equivalent theories and an understanding of how these cases are produced in science. 
Secondly, as was shown in the discussion of Earman‟s argument, the examples of 
underdetermination in science ought to be cases of local underdetermination, such that 
the competing theories are currently empirically equivalent with the possibility that 
further empirical data will be able to distinguish between them.  For the very definition 
of local underdetermination involves cases of empirically equivalent theories which can 
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be resolved given the right amount of evidence. 
 Now that the available arguments from underdetermination have been considered 
and some lessons have been drawn from their subsequent rejection, I move to construct a 
new general argument from underdetermination against scientific realism. To do this I 
will turn to two contemporary examples from science in which local underdetermination 
has actually arisen. These two examples of underdetermination will allow me to show 
exactly what problem for scientific realism stems from local underdetermination. These 
two contemporary examples are from cosmology. 
Case Studies from Cosmology 
 The first example from cosmology concerns the phenomenon called gravitational 
lensing. Gravitational lensing is an effect produced when light passes a large body of 
mass and is pulled by gravity to the outer edges of that body causing the light to be 
focused on the outer edge rather than simply passing around it. Observing this 
phenomenon cosmologists calculate the mass of the stellar object in the middle of the 
lensing effect and conclude, based on the current theory of gravity, that the mass is not 
robust enough to cause the observed lensing of the light. Two theories have been 
developed to explain this phenomenon, dark matter theory and modified gravitational 
theory.8  
                                                          
8
 It should be noted here that many astrophysicists believe that this issue has been resolved, however some 
still argue that there is room for doubt, see Moffat 2007 For the present purposes, i.e. developing a 
philosophical argument, this doubt is sufficient enough to allow the utilization of this example 
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 The dark matter theory posits an unobservable matter that surrounds the 
observable matter in the universe. This dark matter adds to the mass of stellar objects 
such as galaxies and nebulae, but is undetectable by the human eye or any technology 
that we have so far developed, because it does not directly interact with the 
electromagnetic spectrum. Since according to this theory dark matter surrounds the 
observable matter in the universe it accounts for the missing mass needed to explain the 
observed gravitation lensing within the theory of relativity.
9
 The second theory that has 
been posited to explain the observed phenomenon of gravitational lensing is a 
modification of the theory of relativity called the modified gravity theory. This new 
theory states that the force of gravity increases in proportion to the distance from the 
center of mass of a stellar body. Thus, under this theory, gravitational lensing is caused 
by the fact that the force of gravity is stronger on the outer rims of the galaxy or other 
stellar object causing the lensing effect. But the only empirical evidence available is 
gravitational lensing and thus is insufficient to justify a choice between the two 
competing theories. The two theories explain this phenomenon equally well and so they 
are in a state of underdetermination with respect to the available evidence. 
 The second example of underdetermination from Cosmology involves two 
theories that have been developed to explain the accelerated expansion of the universe. In 
1998 astronomers attempting to determine the expansion rate of the universe 
unexpectedly discovered that the universe was not slowing down, as had been previously 
                                                          
9
 The mass of the stellar object in the middle of the lensing effect is not robust enough to cause the 
observed lensing of the light. 
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predicted, but was in fact speeding up. Since this discovery several theories have been 
developed to explain this phenomenon; the two most prominent theories are the theory of 
dark energy and the theory of radial inhomogeneity.  
 The theory of dark energy posits an exotic form of energy that permeates all of 
space called dark energy. Dark energy is a repulsive anti-gravitational force that pushes 
against the galaxies and other large structures of the universe causing the expansion rate 
to increase in proportion to the distances between galaxies. Thus as the distances between 
them increase, the speed at which the galaxies move apart increases (see Kirshner 
2002)
10
. 
 The second theory that has been developed to deal with accelerated expansion is 
the theory of radial inhomogeneity which explains away the accelerated expansion by 
reducing it to an illusion created by our unique position in space. The theory of radial 
inhomogeneity entails that the cosmological principle, which states that the universe is 
homogenous, is incorrect. In a homogenous universe all matter, both visible and dark, is 
evenly distributed throughout the universe and so space is smooth. In a homogenous 
universe light can travel from its source through space unaffected by lumps in space 
caused by a larger or smaller amount of mass. In an inhomogeneous universe, matter is 
not evenly distributed and so light has to traverse the lumps in space caused by high mass 
density. Since we cannot directly observe these lumps in space, if we assume the universe 
                                                          
10
 It should be noted here that dark energy is unrelated to dark matter; it is named dark energy simply 
because cosmologists are in the dark about the specific nature of this energy and that like dark matter it too 
does not interact with the electromagnetic spectrum. 
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is flat the undetected lumps in space make it look like the expansion rate of the universe 
is increasing. More specifically, the theory of radial inhomogeneity explains away the 
accelerated expansion of the universe by positing a lower than average mass density 
surrounding our own galaxy that creates the appearance of accelerated expansion (see 
Clarkson et al 2007).  
Thus both the theory of dark energy and that of radial inhomogeneity explain the 
empirical evidence of the accelerated expansion of the universe. The theory of dark 
energy explains accelerated expansion by positing a repulsive energy that permeates all 
of space, while radial inhomogeneity explains accelerated expansion by positing an area 
of lower mass density that affects light such that it merely appears that the expansion rate 
is accelerating but it in fact is not. Currently the only evidence for both theories is the 
observation of the accelerated expansion of the universe; therefore the two theories are 
empirically equivalent relative to current observational data.  
 More examples of underdetermination in science could be given, but the above 
examples are sufficient to show that underdetermination is indeed a problem for scientific 
realism. A general anti-realist argument from underdetermination can be developed from 
the above cases. They have occurred due to the inability of our current successful theories 
to deal with anomalies detected by experiments conducted from within the paradigms 
established by these theories; in other words, these theories are empirically 
underdetermined since they are faced with anomalies that cannot be explained by 
accepted theories and adjusting these theories to cope with the anomalies produces 
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adapted theories that are empirically equivalent relative to the observed anomalies. From 
the cases that I have examined I have shown that the underdetermination of theories by 
evidence arises from a theory‟s inability to account for observed anomalies. When a 
theory fails due to its inability to account for an unexpected observation, such as 
accelerated expansion or spooky action at a distance, empirically equivalent theories will 
and do arise. From the lessons learnt from these examples we can now generate a new 
general argument from underdetermination from antirealism 
The New General Antirealist Argument from Local Underdetermination 
 Our general argument proceeds as follows: if experimenters are conducting an 
experiment under a theory T, being the most successful theory, and come up to an 
anomalous observation O, where anomalous here means that T cannot explain O, then T 
will often be modified into a set of theories T1 to Tn in order to account for O inside the 
paradigm established by T. T1 to Tn will contain any number of theories that utilize O as 
empirical evidence and thus these theories will be underdetermined. Given the resulting 
underdetermination of the theories by evidence, we cannot say which theories T1 to Tn 
are true. Furthermore, the new general argument can be combined with the pessimistic 
induction, in so far as the pessimistic induction shows that underdetermination has arisen 
in the past. Therefore, based on this empirical equivalence, we cannot justifiably choose 
between any theory within the set T1 to Tn. To help illustrate the general argument I will 
again turn to the above contemporary cases of underdetermination in science. 
 The first example concerning gravitational lensing, illustrates the general 
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argument very well, for even though gravitational lensing was predicted by the general 
theory of relativity, the degree of gravitational lensing observed could not be accounted 
for by the theory. In other words, as discussed above, when cosmologists calculated the 
amount of mass that was creating the observed lensing effects. The amount of mass was 
insufficient to cause the lensing effect according to the theory of relativity. Thus, when 
observing the lensing effects caused by the gravitational attraction of certain bodies of 
mass in the universe, cosmologists observed an anomaly that the general theory of 
relativity could not explain. In order to account for this anomaly, two theories have been 
posited, the dark matter theory and the modified gravity theory which due to the equal 
support provided by the empirical evidence are underdetermined. 
 The second cosmology example also illustrates the new general argument very 
well. The observation of accelerated expansion of the universe was established 
independently by two teams of astronomers. The SCP and High-z Supernovae teams 
utilized measurements of supernovae to determine the expansion rate of the universe. The 
standard model in cosmology predicted that the rate of universal expansion would be 
decreasing due to the effect of gravity. However both studies showed that the rate of 
expansion was instead increasing. Thus the accelerated expansion rate was an unexpected 
or anomalous observation under the standard model of cosmology. The theory of dark 
energy is an adaptation of the standard model of cosmology. The introduction of dark 
energy into the standard model saved the standard model from falsification by the 
observation of universal expansion. On the other hand, the theory of radial 
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inhomogeneity explains away accelerated expansion by suggesting that the standard 
model is incorrect and that the observations that suggest accelerated expansion are only 
an illusion created by our unique position in the universe. Currently the only empirical 
evidence available is evidence that suggests accelerated universal expansion. Thus the 
theories of dark energy and radial inhomogeneity are underdetermined, since they are 
equally supported by the anomalous data. These two theories illustrate the above general 
argument from underdetermination, for here again we have two empirically equivalent 
theories that have been developed to explain an unexpected or anomalous observation. 
 In conclusion, the above examples from contemporary science show that 
empirically equivalent or underdetermined theories arise when a base theory is faced with 
an unexpected or anomalous observation that is either independent from, i.e. not 
predicted by, the base theory or that contradicts it. Furthermore, based on the historical 
elements of the pessimistic induction, we see that underdetermination has arisen, 
presumably in the same manner, in the past as it has in the present. In the traditional view 
of underdetermination, as Earman states, “the anti-realist produces (or at least asserts the 
existence of) theories that are empirically equivalent in that they say the same thing about 
the observable” (1993, 19). Our general argument from underdetermination has been 
developed from contemporary examples of distinct theories that explain the same 
empirical evidence and are thus empirically equivalent. Thus, we see an additional 
proposition that ought to be added to the general argument. Each theory that is introduced 
to account for O, will provide distinct and incompatible accounts of the unobservable 
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realm associated with O. 
 There are at least two reactions to the arguments from underdetermination, retreat 
from or defence of scientific realism. The rest of this thesis will take the latter approach 
and provide a defence of scientific realism. I intend to examine more closely the issue of 
underdetermination related to accelerated expansion by examining the theories of dark 
energy and radial inhomogeneity. The ways in which cosmologists have suggested 
dealing with the case of underdetermination concerning accelerated expansion will be 
examined and some philosophical insight into the problem of underdetermination will be 
drawn based on this discussion. To me, the case of underdetermination in cosmology 
concerning dark energy and radial inhomogeneity is the most promising in providing 
further insights into solving the problem of underdetermination and perhaps redeeming 
scientific realism from the argument from underdetermination.  According to the 
contemporary philosophical literature, if underdetermination is empirically resolved in 
science, then we can be realists concerning the successful theory. This claim will be 
evaluated based on the further discussion of dark energy, radial inhomogeneity, and the 
new general argument from underdetermination. An argument against this defence will 
be considered, however it will be shown that ultimately the arguments from 
underdetermination, both global and local, fail to establish a good case against scientific 
realism. 
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Chapter 2: Defending Scientific Realism from the New General Argument 
2.1 A Case Study; Accelerated Expansion of the Universe 
In 1998, astronomers attempting to measure the expansion rate of the universe 
based on Type Ia Supernovae discovered that the universe is not slowing down in its 
expansion, as predicted by the Standard Model, but is in fact speeding up. The method 
used to establish accelerated expansion of the universe utilized Type Ia Supernovae (SN 
Ia). These explosions are 100,000 times brighter than the previously used candles, bright 
objects in the universe utilized as measuring points, called cepheid variable stars. With 
this high degree of luminosity, supernovae can be observed from well equipped ground 
based telescopes. However, the one downside to using supernovae is that unlike cepheid 
variable stars that have a long life, supernovae don‟t repeat their cycle, but if they can be 
found, supernovae are an invaluable tool for cosmology. The physics of supernovae can 
be analyzed based on the intensity and spectrum of radiation emitted from them, and 
most of those observed so far have the same luminosity. The most prominent type of 
supernovae are of the type Ia, called SN Ia. These supernovae are the result of a 
thermonuclear explosion of a white dwarf star, thus SN Ia are very similar to one another 
in spectral composition and intensity. Given this, the recession velocity of the SN Ia and 
therefore the rate of universal expansion can be determined by the redshift of the SN Ia.  
Redshift is an expression of how the light waves produced by the SN Ia are 
directly affected by the recession velocity. The light waves produced by luminous objects 
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in space are directly affected by the movement of that object.  The wavelength of light 
increases if its source is moving away from the observer and decreases as it moves closer 
to the observer. The effect that movement has on the distance between waves is called the 
Doppler Effect. 
The Doppler Effect is a phenomenon that affects all waves, a common experience 
of the Doppler Effect concerns sound. As a car approaches an observer standing on the 
side of the road, the volume and pitch of noise made by the car increases until it is at its 
peak right in front of the observer and while the car moves away from the observer the 
sound decreases until it cannot be heard anymore. Whereas the Doppler Effect produced 
by the car is displayed by the pitch of the sound of the engine, the Doppler Effect 
produced by luminous objects in space is displayed by the color of the light detected by 
the observer. If the wavelength is produced by a luminous object is large then the light 
that is produced will be red in color, while if the distance between the waves produced by 
it are small then the light that is produced will be blue in color. The wavelength of light is 
affected by the direction in which the luminous object is traveling in relation to the 
observer. Thus, if the light is closer to the red end of the spectrum then the luminous 
object is moving away from the observer and is said to be redshifted, if the light is closer 
to the blue end of the spectrum then the luminous object is moving towards the observer 
and is said to be blueshifted. Furthermore, the faster the object is moving away from the 
observer the fainter the object will be, while a brighter object indicates a slower velocity. 
Dark Energy 
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 The accelerated expansion of the universe follows from the observations of two 
separate research groups, the Supernova Cosmology Project (SCP) headed by Saul 
Perlmutter and the High-z Supernovae Search Team headed by Brian Schmidt, utilizing 
SN Ia as candles. The SCP observed redshifts of forty-two SN Ia (Perlmutter, 2001 and 
Perlmutter, 2003), while the High-z team studied sixteen SN Ia and both determined that 
the rate of universal expansion is increasing. Initially, both teams sought to establish 
whether or not the universal expansion rate was slowing down as the standard model 
predicted. However, as the teams began to study the SN Ia, they observed that the 
supernovae expressing a redshift near 0.5 were 25 percent fainter than expected. The 
expected luminosity was based on the standard model of the universe, which expresses a 
mass density of 1 ( m = 1) with no cosmological constant. The luminosity of a 
supernova is directly related to the expressed redshift and the rate of universal expansion. 
As Kirshner explains, “if the universe is slowing down, then a distant supernova will 
appear brighter than if the universe is expanding at a constant rate” (2004, p.164). Thus, 
the fact that the supernovae expressing a redshift near 0.5 were fainter than expected 
implied that the light from the supernovae had to travel farther than was expected and 
thus the universal expansion rate is accelerating. 
 The prevailing theory to explain accelerated expansion is one that posits dark 
energy, a form of repulsionary force. The exact nature of dark energy is elusive; if it does 
exist dark energy could be an unknown „energy‟ that is a property of space itself, an 
anti-gravitational force which pushes the galaxies apart, or it could be something else 
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entirely. While the exact nature of dark energy is unknown, it is posited to be something 
similar to a non-zero cosmological constant (CC) that permeates all of space. The idea of 
a CC goes back to Einstein, who used it to adjust his equations in GTR so that the 
universe is static, for without the CC, the equations imply that the universe is dynamic, 
that it is expanding or contracting, a conclusion that Einstein could not accept (Kragh, 
2007, 132). After Hubble showed through observation that the universe was in fact 
expanding, Einstein realized his mistake and saw no further use for the cosmological 
constant CC and, as the story goes, ended up calling the CC the greatest blunder of his 
life. 
 To bring the Dark Energy theory into contrast with the other suggested solution, 
an analysis of the suggested tests to determine whether or not the Copernican and 
Cosmological Principles are justified. The Copernican and Cosmological Principles are 
fundamental postulates that have been at the base of the cosmological models, including 
the prevailing Friedmann-Lemaître-Robertson-Walker (FLRW) model.  The Copernican 
Principle states that our location within the universe is not privileged in any sense; the 
Milky Way is just another galaxy among billions within the Universe, it has no distinct 
position within the universe. 
 The Cosmological Principle, “states that our observations would roughly be the 
same, if we were located at any other place in the Universe” (Beisbart and Jung, 225). 
Thus according to the Cosmological Principle the universe is homogeneous and isotropic. 
For the universe to be homogeneous, it must look the same to separate observers 
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performing their observations at any two different places within the universe. While, 
“within the definition of isotropy observers at the same point compare observations that 
are restricted to different directions” (Beisbart and Jung, 234) and given these 
observations the observer cannot distinguish between the directions observed. It may 
seem odd at this point for astronomers to hold that the universe looks the same for 
different observers in different places of the universe or that different directions may look 
the same for one observer. 
 The difference between homogeneity and isotropy concerns position.  Isotropy 
concerns observations made from one position in the universe, thus it is a description of a 
particular location.  As Beisbart and Jung state “within the definition of isotropy 
observers at the same point compare observations that are restricted to different 
directions” (234). If the universe is isotropic, then the observations made in different 
directions would be identical. To make this clearer we can consider spacetime as the 
subject being observed. As Beisbart and Jung state, “spacetime is isotropic if from any 
spacetime point no directions can be discriminated on the base of observations” (239). 
Conversely, homogeneity concerns any two different positions in the universe and is 
potentially a description of any positions in the universe. This means that no matter 
where two observers are in the universe their observations of the overall structure will be 
identical. 
If you look out into the night sky you can easily see that the universe looks 
different depending on the direction in which you look in. In one direction you might see 
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Orion and in the other the Little and Big Dippers, and conclude that the universe does not 
look the same in each direction. However, physicists do not apply the terms 
homogeneous and isotropic to the small scale structures such as star constellations, 
galaxy clusters and the like, but rather to large scale structures such as the distribution of 
matter and energy, which, under these principles would be smoothly distributed 
throughout. As Ellis states “the standard models of cosmology are based on the 
assumption that once one has averaged over a large enough physical scale, isotropy is 
observed by all fundamental observers…[furthermore] when this isotropy is exact, the 
universe is spatially homogeneous as well as isotropic” (2006, Ellis‟ italics, 2). 
According to the standard models of cosmology the structure of space-time is 
homogeneous and isotropic. If we took any two sections of space-time, any sections 
could be mapped into each other in the right way, then the universe is homogeneous and 
isotropic (Beisbart and Jung, 239). And so, we have two principles, the Copernican and 
the Cosmological, that are at the root of Cosmology. A group of astronomers, Clarkson et 
al, have proposed two experiments that would test these principles and in so doing 
resolve the issue of accelerated expansion without positing dark energy. This research 
group proposes that the observations that suggest that the expansion rate of the universe 
is accelerating is due to an illusion created by the structure of space-time itself.  Thus, 
Clarkson and his associates propose to undermine the Copernican Principle by showing 
that we occupy a special place within the universe. This would effectively undermine the 
Cosmological Principle by showing that the universe is not homogenous and isotropic but 
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is instead radially inhomogeneous. By radially inhomogeneous the authors mean that the 
mass density within the universe is not smooth, but is instead uneven. The unevenness is 
caused by areas of mass that are either more or less dense than the average mass density.  
Such a change in mass density would cause bumps in the otherwise smooth spacetime. In 
the case of radial inhomogeneity, the area of less or more mass would extend radially 
around our galaxy. Before moving on to discuss radial inhomogeneity and the proposed 
experiments to verify the existence of this structure, we must move to consider the 
relationship between homogenous models of the universe and dark energy. 
As was said above the Cosmological Principle is at the root of the prevalent 
cosmological model called the FLRW model. This model is constituted from two 
important mathematical systems and two specific equations. In the FLRW model, the 
universe is also symmetrical and can be described by a set of geometries called the 
Robertson-Walker geometries. The Friedman and Lemaitre equations which describe the 
dynamic structure and evolution of the universe combined with these geometries produce 
the FLRW model. It was according to this model that the SPC and high-z teams 
observing the SN Ia expected to find that universal expansion was slowing down. 
However, as discussed above the observations instead showed that the expansion rate is 
speeding up rather than slowing down and in order to preserve the FLRW model a 
nonzero cosmological constant is required. Thus the dark energy theory is a direct 
product of this model and so it follows that another explanation for the accelerated 
expansion can be produced by negating the hypothesis that the universe is homogeneous 
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and isotropic. 
 In “A General Test of the Copernican Principle”, Chris Clarkson et al. propose 
that the traditional approach to testing the Copernican Principle, that of developing 
models that do not involve this Principle and then subjecting them to empirical tests, is 
not an efficient test. Furthermore, the majority of astronomers do not agree with this 
approach and argue against it by appealing to Occam‟s razor. The simpler models are the 
homogenous and isotropic models, such as the FLRW Model. The traditional approach to 
testing for inhomogeneity is model dependent, i.e. the scientists develop a model and then 
try to make that model fit observation. Clarkson et al believe that rather than developing 
an inhomogeneous model and trying to make it fit observation, unbiased observations 
should be made first and then the FLRW model should be scrutinized based on those 
observations (Clarkson et al, 1). 
 If the universe is radially inhomogeneous, then the observed redshifts that have 
led to the hypothesis of accelerated expansion can be accounted for by the nature of space 
itself rather than the speed at which the SN Ia are moving. Radial inhomogeneity implies 
that there are areas of space which contain more mass than other areas within the 
universe, thus the gravitational force exerted by these areas is higher than other areas 
within the universe. The higher amount of gravity causes space to curve which in turn 
affects the light waves given off by SN Ia to appear as though they have been altered due 
to an increase in the velocity of the source. These curved areas increase the distance 
between the light waves in much the same way as an accelerated recession velocity 
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would, thereby causing the observed effect that has lead Cosmologists to conclude 
accelerated expansion (Clarkson et al, 2). 
 Before we consider how Clarkson and his team have proposed to confirm their 
theory while falsifying the theory of dark energy, we will move to a consideration of how 
cosmologists are adding further constraints to the theory of dark energy and why this 
does not count as confirmation of that theory. For example one team of cosmologists are 
trying to determine, more accurately, the expansion rate of the universe. This research is 
effective in determining the rate of expansion more accurately than the supernovae 
research groups were able to, however it is not effective in distinguishing between the 
theories of radial inhomogeneity and dark energy. 
2.2 How not to solve underdetermination issues in science 
 A recent study utilizing the XMM-Newton (x-ray multi mirror Newton) space 
based observatory has been conducted in order to put further limitations on the equation 
of state that describes dark energy. The XMM-Newton is a space based telescope capable 
of detecting, absorbing and imaging x-rays, thereby enabling scientists to detect objects at 
great distances. This project is believed to have provided data that, as Rapetti et al claim, 
has provided “a direct and independent method by which to measure the acceleration of 
the universe, providing additional discriminating power for dark energy studies” (2005, 
pg. 556). However, even if it is shown that further refinement of the parameters 
governing accelerated expansion provides more discriminating power for dark energy 
studies, this will still not enable scientists to discriminate dark energy theory from the 
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theory of radial inhomogeneity. Providing more evidence for accelerated expansion, 
adding to the empirical evidence that required the development of the two theories that 
are now underdetermined, will not enable scientists to discriminate between the various 
models of the theories of dark energy, however the theory of dark energy and the theory 
of radial inhomogeneity will still be underdetermined. 
 Since the observation of accelerated expansion in 1998 by both the High-z team 
and the SCP, more empirical evidence has been found from independent studies, studies 
of other candles, i.e. not SN Ia, that support the hypothesis of accelerated expansion. As 
was stated above, one such study is „The XMM-NEWTON  project‟ performed by D.H. 
Lumb et al, which utilizes the new satellite, XMM-Newton, to observe a sample of high 
redshift galaxy clusters (GCs). The satellite based observatory, XMM Newton, can detect 
the distant GCs by detecting the X-rays emitted by them, and so this observatory was 
used to determine the rate of expansion based on GCs.  The goal of this study was “to 
measure the luminosity and the temperature of the clusters to a precision of 
[approximately] 10%, leading to constraints on the possible evolution of the 
luminosity-temperature (Lx-Tx) relation, and ultimately on the values of the matter 
density, M, and to a lesser extent, the cosmological constant ” (2004, pg. 853).  
 The method involved in the XMM Newton project utilizing the GCs is much the 
same as that employed in the experiments utilizing the Supernovae. If the recession 
velocity of a GC is great enough, the GC itself can act as a candle in much the same way 
as Supernovae. As the GC moves further and further away from the observer, the 
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wavelength of the x-rays waves emitted by the GC itself will become greater and this 
distance can be used to determine the recession velocity. Thus, as with the supernovae 
study, the XMM Newton project sought to determine the expansion rate by observing the 
redshift of these candles. 
 The further confirmation of accelerated expansion is however, by no means 
further confirmation of the existence of dark energy. As was shown above, both the 
theory of dark energy and the theory of radial inhomogeneity are both based on the 
observations of accelerated expansion. Thus, any further confirmation of accelerated 
expansion is not further confirmation of dark energy or of radial inhomogeneity, but is 
simply further confirmation of the observation that has lead to the underdetermination of 
the two theories. Now an objection could be made against the sceptical approach to these 
studies. For the study by Rapetti et al claims that the XMM Newton observations put a 
constraint on dark energy and thus it is indeed a study that confirms its existence. 
 At first this objection seems well warranted, however the deciding factor will be 
what exactly the scientists mean setting further constraints on dark energy and how 
exactly they go about doing this. Cosmologists are setting further constraints on dark 
energy by refining the measurements of mass density and accelerated expansion. They 
then use these measurements to choose between the various models of dark energy. The 
Rapetti et al study utilizes the GC surveys, along with the SN Ia surveys and a survey of 
the cosmic microwave background, CMB (2005). This analysis examines two dark 
energy models, the model that utilizes the cosmological constant as discussed above and 
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the scalar field model. The scalar field model avoids the fine tuning of initial conditions 
that is necessary for the cosmological constant and also allows for an evolving function 
of redshift, meaning as the universe expands the redshift of galaxies throughout the 
universe increases in proportion to the expansion rate (Rapetti et al, 556). Rapetti et al 
apply the three surveys to set limits on the two models for dark energy; this is most 
evident when they conclude that “the SN Ia and cluster data provide the primary source 
of information on the evolution of dark energy. Of these, the SN Ia data currently 
contribute the strongest constraints” (2005, 562). This data can only be used once a 
tighter constraint on the mass density is established by utilizing the CMB and GC studies. 
The mass density, as was noted above in our discussion of the SN Ia surveys in the 
nineties, puts limits on the expansion rate of the universe, even if we posit an 
anti-gravitational force like dark energy. Thus this study is attempting to further 
understand the nature of accelerated expansion which would effectively set limits on dark 
energy if it does indeed exist. Of course a more developed understanding of the nature of 
accelerated expansion could also lead to a further understanding of the cosmic voids that 
have been posited to explain away accelerated expansion. If we can determine the exact 
value of redshift then we can determine the size of the void surrounding our place in the 
universe that makes the light appear to be redshifted. 
 In conclusion, the further confirmation of accelerated expansion will not allow 
scientists to confirm the theory of dark energy while falsifying the theory of radial 
inhomogeneity. Even granted that the combined observational evidence allows scientists 
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to discriminate between the various models of the theory of dark energy, it does not allow 
us to discriminate between the theories of dark energy and radial inhomogeneity. Thus, 
we are still unable to discriminate between these two theories, because they are still 
underdetermined by the currently available evidence. 
 What this means is that, utilizing the language of the general argument from 
underdetermination, further confirmation of the observation that led to the development 
of the two underdetermined theories will not allow scientists to discriminate between the 
various theories within the set of underdetermined theories. Clarkson et al, however, have 
proposed an experiment that will be enable scientists to discriminate between the two 
theories of dark energy and radial inhomogeneity. An examination of this experiment will 
enable me to determine how underdetermination issues are resolved in science and what 
epistemic value such methods might have in salvaging scientific realism from the new 
general argument from underdetermination. 
2.3 How to Solve Underdetermination Issues in Science 
Radial Inhomogeneity 
In order to test for radial inhomogeneity and thus test the Cosmological Principle 
and the FLRW model, Clarkson and his associates have proposed an experiment which 
will test the consistency relation between the distance derived from the observed Hubble 
rate of an SN Ia and the distance derived from the luminosity of that SN Ia. In other 
words, the astronomers propose to find an SN Ia and test the distance measurements 
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based on Hubble rate (H) by comparing it with another distance measurement, the 
luminosity distance (D). These two distance measurements are distinct distant 
measurements, because the Hubble rate (H) is based on the recession velocity of the SN 
Ia and is thus a direct result of the redshift, while luminosity distance (D) is based on the 
physical understanding of the candle and the observed brightness or luminosity of the 
object. If radial inhomogeneity is correct and a curve in space does exist, then the 
wavelengths of the SN Ia will be stretched such that it will look as though the light has 
been affected by a high acceleration rate. Thus, if the theory of radial inhomogeneity is 
correct, H will be affected by curves in space in that the wavelength of the SN Ia will be 
increased, the light will be reddened, while D, the luminosity of the SN Ia, will be less 
affected. 
If the two distance measurements are equal (fig. 1), then the Cosmological 
Principle is further confirmed and accelerated expansion due to dark energy is the best 
explanation for the observed phenomenon. The observed redshift of the supernova would 
be best explained by accelerated expansion. If the relation is not consistent (fig. 2), then 
the Cosmological Principle and the FLRW model are not correct and the universe is 
radially inhomogeneous. In figure one the lengths of both the solid arrow and the dotted 
line are the same representing the fact that the two distances are equal. However, in 
figure two, the lines are not the same length, the one represented by the dotted arrow (H) 
is affected by the curved area of space which is represented by the square in the diagram 
making the supernovae appear to be where the dotted circle is when in actuality it is 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
44 
 
 
where the solid circle is as determined by the luminosity distance (D). Not only is the 
distance affected by the area of inhomogeneity, but so is the redshift. If radial 
inhomogeneity is correct the curve in space will increase the wavelength of the light from 
the supernovae making it appear as though the supernova is receding away from the Earth 
at an increasing rate. Thus figure one represents an isotropic and homogenous universe 
where the propagation of light is affected by the accelerated expansion, while figure two 
represents a radial inhomogeneous universe where the propagation of light is affected by 
the curvature of space caused by an area of less mass. 
  
Figure 1 
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Figure 2 
How to solve underdetermination issues in science 
 At present the dark energy theory and radial inhomogeneity theory are empirically 
indistinguishable, the evidence gathered to date equally supports that the universe is 
accelerating or the hypothesis that the FLRW model is incorrect and the universe is in 
fact curved in some sections and thus inhomogeneous. However, the experiment 
proposed by Clarkson et al has the ability to falsify or verify the FLRW model, which 
will enable them to distinguish between the two underdetermined theories. Clarkson et al 
propose an independent test that has the ability to falsify one of the theories, while 
verifying the other. If it is shown that the distance measurements of H and D is equal, 
then the universe is indeed homogenous and isotropic, and the theory of dark energy will 
be verified and the radial inhomogeneity theory will be falsified. However, if it is shown 
measurements of H and D are not equal and the universe is not homogenous and 
isotropic, then the radial inhomogeneity theory will be verified and the dark energy 
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theory will be falsified. 
 The test that Clarkson et al have proposed is a fundamental test of both dark 
energy and radial inhomogeneity, because it is a test of the assumptions underlying both 
theories. As we saw above, the theory of dark energy resulting from the observations of 
accelerated expansion presupposes a homogenous and isotropic universe. Thus, the 
Clarkson et al test will attempt to falsify dark energy by falsifying one of its fundamental 
auxiliary hypotheses and will in return verify the radial inhomogeneity theory by 
confirming that the universe is indeed inhomogeneous. Going back to our general 
argument, a means of resolving an issue of underdetermination is to test, empirically or 
experimentally, an auxiliary hypothesis of one of the theories within the set of 
underdetermined theories. Therefore, underdetermination issues in science can be 
resolved by testing the auxiliary hypotheses of the various theories within the set T1 to 
Tn. 
 In conclusion underdetermination issues do indeed arise in science, these issues 
are, however, resolved empirically. Since theory choice between two or more empirically 
equivalent theories is done by empirical means either by testing the assumptions of a 
theory or discovering independent empirical observations, we can be realists about the 
resulting theories; we can know when a theory is true. However, the antirealist can argue 
that this type of defense against the general argument from underdetermination disregard 
the temporal nature of the issue. 
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2.4 The Temporal Objection 
 Such an antirealist objection would proceed as follows: the amount of time 
between the development of the set of underdetermined theories to the empirical 
confirmation of one theory over another is relative to each situation. For example, the 
first observations that established accelerated expansion came from two separate teams of 
astronomers over ten years ago (Kirshner, 2002) and yet the theories that explain this 
observed phenomenon are still underdetermined. This is a problem because the theories 
of dark energy and radial inhomogeneity are mutually exclusive theories. Dark energy is 
based on a model of the universe that is homogenous and isotropic, while the theory of 
radial inhomogeneity is based on a model of the universe that is inhomogeneous. Thus, 
given the current situation of underdetermination, not only can we not know that the 
theory of dark energy is true or that the theory of radial inhomogeneity is true, but we 
cannot know whether or not the models that these theories are built upon are true. 
 Going back to the general argument then we see that when a set of theories T1 to 
Tn is underdetermined, the realist position is unjustified not only concerning the theories 
within the set, but also concerning the base theories or models. Furthermore, from the 
epistemic position created by having underdetermined theories, we are unable to 
determine when the issue will be resolved, or indeed even if it will be resolved at all. 
Scientific realism states that we can know when a theory is true or at least approximately 
true, however when two theories are underdetermined we are not able to determine which 
theory is true. Thus, even though it is possible for scientists to gather more evidence in 
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favour of one theory, it takes time to do so and until the issue is resolved we are unable to 
say which theory is true. Furthermore, it is not just the truth of the underdetermination 
theories that is at issue, but also the truth of the base theories. The theories of dark energy 
and radial inhomogeneity are underdetermined and thus we cannot know which theory is 
true. Furthermore, as we have seen these theories are built upon models of the universe, 
the theory of dark matter is built upon the FLRW model and so until the issue of 
underdetermination is resolved we are not in a position to judge the truth of either model. 
It is of little consequence for the realist to claim that after the issue of underdetermination 
has been resolved we can then be realists about the theory and its base theory or model. 
In conclusion, the new general argument from underdetermination establishes that local 
underdetermination is indeed a problem for scientific realism. For given a set of 
underdetermined theories, we cannot be realists about any theory within the set or the 
base theory that those theories attempt to modify and salvage. In conclusion, contrary to 
the conclusions drawn from my consideration of the accelerated expansion problem, the 
fact that underdetermination issues in science are resolved over time does not save 
scientific realism from the argument from underdetermination. For during a situation of 
underdetermination it is impossible to tell when the issue will be resolved. Until a 
resolution comes about we are unable to be scientific realists about the underdetermined 
theories and the base theories involved. 
 The above case study of the underdetermined theories dealing with accelerated 
expansion shows how scientists attempt to resolve underdetermination issues in science. 
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However, as was shown above these examples do not salvage scientific realism from the 
general argument from underdetermination. There is no means of determining when an 
issue of underdetermination will be resolved and until it is resolved we are not in a 
position to be realists concerning any of the theories that are underdetermined or the base 
theories they are built upon. 
2.5 Murder Realism and the New General Argument 
 One objection that could be made to the problem that the new general argument 
raises for scientific realism is that it does not challenge the fundamental tenet of scientific 
realism. This objection can be best formed if we consider the analogy of murder 
realism.11 Let us suppose that we want to be murder realists. A murder realist believes 
that whenever a dead body has been found a murderer can be found, provided the 
individual has not died of natural causes or by accident, and proven guilty based on 
empirical evidence. Furthermore, even if there are initially multiple suspects and then the 
evidence points towards only one suspect, say there are only one set of bloody boot prints 
leaving the crime scene, the murder realist maintains that a suspect or a group of suspect 
will be found and proven guilty. As the investigation is being conducted, the detectives 
involved are in a similar epistemic position to the scientists who are trying to determine 
one theory over another. The fact that the case is not solved immediately, but takes 
several days to solve does not undermine the murder realist‟s claim that it can indeed be 
                                                          
11
 Here I am drawing on the remarks of Mark Wilson from the 2010 Waterloo graduate 
conference. 
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solved. 
 Analogously, the scientific realist claims that our most successful scientific 
theories are successful because they are true, or at least approximately true. Thus the 
scientific realist can claim that a case of local underdetermination can be resolved; that 
one of the theories within an empirically equivalent set can be determined to be true. As 
in the murder realist case, the scientific realist accepts that the issue cannot always be 
solved within a relatively short period of time. It may be cold comfort to the scientists 
involved that the issue will eventually be resolved and that had things been different the 
issue may have been resolved faster, but the scientific realist is quite comfortable with the 
fact that the issue of underdetermination, of the local sort, can and will be resolved. 
 Indeed, many scientific realists maintain that underdetermination is resolved in 
many different ways. As with the case of murder realism, the fact that the determination 
of the truth of one theory from a set of empirically equivalent theories takes an 
indeterminate amount of time does not undermine or challenge the scientific realist claim 
that scientific theories are approximately true. Therefore, the suspension of belief in a 
base theory and the theories that are empirically equivalent, relative to the data at some 
particular time, does not undermine the realist claim that over all scientific theories are at 
least approximately true. 
 In conclusion, chapter one and two have shown that the arguments from global 
underdetermination produce and illustrate nothing but some possibly philosophically 
interesting limits on our knowledge, while the argument from local underdetermination 
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does indeed raise a problem for scientific realism. In answer to the global 
underdetermination arguments such as the demon controlled world and other thought 
experiments that question the ontological reality of the world we live in, the scientific 
realist can reply that our theories are true or approximately true within the world we live 
in. If we limit our standard of truth to the world in which we reside, whether or not it is 
the real world, we can justifiably maintain that our theories are approximately true. The 
global underdetermination cases that can be developed out of the algorithmic approach 
underline the limits of our knowledge. For example, the cases derived from Newtonian 
Mechanics shows that we can never be justified in asserting that we have found all of the 
true properties of the universe, since no amount of evidence will allow us to distinguish 
between a universe that is at rest or in motion relative to absolute space. The topological 
structure of spacetime problem, discussed by Earman, also shows the limits of our 
knowledge while not calling into question scientific realism, all that it shows is that we 
cannot distinguish between the possible topological structures of space, due to our finite 
role and position in the universe. Both the algorithmic approach and the real world 
example of the topological structures of space time are philosophical problems rather 
than genuine problems for scientific realism. 
 While considering the argument from local underdetermination, we have 
established that locally underdetermined theories arise within science when an 
unexpected observation is made that a current theory cannot explain. The murder 
realist-scientific realist analogy then showed that the new argument from 
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underdetermination is in fact unsuccessful in its attempt to undermine scientific realism, 
for the scientific realist can still maintain that one theory will be shown to be true or at 
least approximately true given enough time. Thus the general argument from 
underdetermination has been shown to be a methodological problem that can be resolved 
through appeals to science. The above case from contemporary cosmology showed that 
local underdetermination issues are resolved in science by searching for independent 
observations that establish one theory over the other theories that are empirically 
equivalent relative to currently available evidence. Therefore, the above considerations of 
anti-realist arguments from underdetermination have shown that both types of arguments 
from underdetermination, global and local, are unsuccessful in their attempts to dispute 
scientific realism. The only anti-realist arguments that survive are the pessimistic 
induction and Kyle Stanford‟s argument from unconceived alternatives. The rest of this 
thesis will be a discussion and analysis of Stanford‟s unconceived alternatives and the 
pessimistic induction. 
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Chapter 3: The Problem of Unconceived Alternatives 
3.1 Chasing Stanford 
 In Exceeding Our Grasp, Kyle Stanford reintroduces and reworks the argument 
from unconceived alternatives. This argument stems from Duhem‟s worries about 
eliminative inferences in science, in which scientists use empirical tests to choose one 
theory from two or more underdetermined theories by eliminating the competing theories. 
Duhem‟s worry, and thus Stanford‟s worry, is that “such an eliminative inferential 
procedure will only guide us to the truth about nature if the truth is among these 
competitors in the first place” (Stanford, 2006, 28). Stanford‟s claim then is that 
eliminative inferences only allow us to choose among the conceived theories that are up 
for debate, while the history of science shows that we are often unable to conceive of the 
theory that will eventually become empirically well confirmed. Prior to Einstein, for 
example, Newtonian Mechanics was shown, through eliminative inferences, to be the 
best theory. However, had the general theory of relativity been conceived of at the time, it 
would have been the best, most empirically confirmed theory. As Stanford says, “the 
historical record suggests that in science we are typically unable to exhaust the space of 
likely, plausible, or reasonable candidate theoretical explanations for a given set of 
phenomena before proceeding to eliminate all but a single contender, but this is just what 
would be required for eliminative inferences to be reliable” (2006, 29). 
 Stanford does not intend to undermine the importance of eliminative inferences 
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altogether; he only wishes to point out the limited usefulness of such inferences. When 
eliminative inferences are used to exclude alternatives, they can be incorrect, for they 
disregard the possibility of unconceived alternatives; when such inferences are used 
simply to choose between various possibilities that exhaust the list of all possibilities, 
they can be useful, for they can show that one possibility is more likely than the other 
available possibilities. For example, if we are trying to choose between two explanations, 
eliminative inferences based on the available evidence will allow us to determine which 
possibility is more likely. Stanford uses the following example: 
 “These tracks were made by a dog or a wolf. 
 No one has ever seen a wolf [in California]. 
 Therefore, these tracks were made by a dog” (2006, 29) 
The fact that no one has seen a wolf in southern California does not make it impossible 
that the tracks do indeed belong to a wolf; it only makes this possibility more unlikely 
than the possibility that the tracks belong to a dog. The implausibility that the tracks were 
made by a wolf allows us to eliminate this option, leaving us with the more likely 
explanation that the tracks belong to a dog. Furthermore, the two options, whether the 
tracks were made by a dog or a wolf, is an exhaustive set, for the tracks are too small to 
have been made by a bear and too large to have been made by a coyote, thus ruling out 
the claim that the tracks were made by a wolf leads necessarily to the claim that they 
were made by a dog. The application of eliminative inferences in this context is justified 
and reliable, for it is clear that the chances of hitherto unconceived alternatives existing in 
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the above example are remote. Once eliminative inferences are applied in science, 
Stanford maintains, we can be anything but confident that the possibility of unconceived 
alternatives is remote. Indeed, Stanford believes “that the historical record of scientific 
inquiry itself provides abundant evidence that the specific requirements for the reliable 
application of eliminative inference…are routinely unsatisfied in the context of 
theoretical science conducted by creatures who are cognitively constituted as we are” (his 
emphasis, 2006, 32). Thus, eliminative inferences are useful if and only if they are used 
when deciding between an exhaustive set of hypotheses. 
 Stanford‟s argument from unconceived alternatives is a different inductive 
argument than the pessimistic induction, which deals with past and present theories, 
because the argument from unconceived alternatives concerns the theorists of past and 
present science. The pessimistic induction claims that past scientific theories have been 
shown to be false despite the virtues they have in common with our current most 
successful theories and that since we are in the same epistemic position, our current most 
successful theories must also be false. In contrast, as Stanford states, the argument from 
unconceived alternatives points out “that present theorists are no better able to exhaust 
the space of serious, well-confirmed possible theoretical explanations of the phenomena 
than past theorists have turned out to be” (2006, 44). Thus the problem of unconceived 
alternatives is not an argument from underdetermination as classically conceived. Indeed, 
Stanford construes “the problem of unconceived alternatives not as competing with the 
traditional challenges of underdetermination and the pessimistic induction so much as 
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bringing out what was most significant and compelling about those challenges to begin 
with” (2006, 45). 
 According to Stanford, his argument from unconceived alternatives reworks the 
two main challenges for scientific realism outlined by the pessimistic induction and the 
argument from underdetermination. The first problem, adapted from the argument of 
underdetermination, is what Stanford calls the new induction. The new induction claims 
that science continually occupies a predicament of underdetermination, wherein scientists 
have repeatedly failed to conceive of scientifically serious alternatives to accepted 
theories that would be as well confirmed by the available evidence. Some of these 
alternative theories have eventually been conceived and then accepted by future scientists 
and, Stanford maintains, this same predicament, by induction, can be applied to our 
current scientific theories. For example before it was conceived the theory of relativity 
was an unconceived alternative to Newtonian mechanics since it is supported by the same 
empirical evidence that once supported Newtonian mechanics. Furthermore, the theory of 
relativity eventually replaced Newtonian mechanics and it follows by induction, 
according to Stanford, that the theory of relativity will eventually be replaced by what is 
at this moment an unconceived alternative to it. 
 The second problem that Stanford‟s argument further develops is the problem of 
unconceived alternatives, which points out that historical patterns outlined within both 
the pessimistic induction and the new induction are due to our inability to develop an 
exhaustive list of alternatives from which to draw the most successful theories based on 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
57 
 
 
eliminative inferences. If science is indeed continuously faced with the issue of 
underdetermination between the most successful theories and some unconceived 
alternatives, as the new induction maintains, then scientific realism is false, because we 
can never know when our most successful theories are true, or even approximately true. 
Furthermore, if the means we use to choose the most successful theory out of a set of 
empirical equivalent theories is unreliable, due to the fact that the set of theories involved 
are not chosen from an exhaustive list of possible scientific theories, then our current 
most successful theories are probably not the best theories to explain the available 
evidence. So far the arguments in favour of the new induction and the problem of 
unconceived alternatives have not been well supported; the above historical case utilizing 
the change from Newtonian mechanics to the general theory of relativity was, if anything, 
cursory. As Stanford rightly claims, “this discussion makes clear…how much ultimately 
depends on my claim that the historical record supports the new induction and the 
problem of unconceived alternatives in the way that [has been suggested]” (2006, 47). 
Thus, I will now turn to Stanford‟s discussion of three historical cases that provide some 
direct evidence for his claim. Once Stanford‟s three historical cases have been discussed, 
I will move to consider an argument proposed by Hardin and Rosenberg (1982) that 
attempts to show that unconceived alternatives do not challenge scientific realism 
because the referential terms of past theories are carried over into contemporary theories.  
I will then discuss Stanford‟s argument against this position and then introduce a newly 
revised philosophical position called structural realism. It will be shown that structural 
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realism is the most promising approach to dealing with Stanford‟s new induction. 
 The examples Stanford uses are not from Physics, where one might expect 
examples of the new induction and unconceived alternatives would be easily found, but 
are instead from biology. This is a somewhat surprising move because as Stanford points 
out, “the revolutionary and counterintuitive character of such conceptual innovations as 
the electromagnetic field, general relativity, and virtually all things quantum mechanical 
has left many of those knowledgeable in the physical sciences with a healthy respect for 
presently unconceived possibilities” (2006, 51), while biological science affords “a 
staunch tradition of scientific realism among biologists and philosophers of biology 
alike…” (2006, 52). Thus it may seem unlikely that Stanford will find any cases of 
unconceived alternatives within biology. The examples that Stanford discusses are from 
the specific area of biology that deals with generation and inheritance. Stanford is indeed 
able to find many examples that add support to the argument from unconceived 
alternatives and provides a detailed analysis of each example. For the purposes of this 
thesis, I intend only to examine three of the historical cases cited by Stanford as evidence 
for his argument from unconceived alternatives. 
3.2 Case Studies from Biology 
 The three historical cases concern theorizing about generation and inheritance; 
contemporary biology distinguishes between these two separate phenomena maintaining 
that they occupy distinct scientific landscapes however such a distinction is a relatively 
new development. As Stanford explains, “until comparatively recently…the phenomenon 
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of inheritance, reproduction, development, growth, and repair were typically regarded as 
aspects of a single process, forming a single domain of theorizing and a single field of 
study” (2006, 52). This field of study was simply described as the study of generation and 
is generally described as unproblematic, for philosophers and historians of biology 
maintain that later theories were anticipated in some general way by earlier theories. The 
first example, and thus Stanford‟s first case study, concerns the nineteenth century 
teleomechanical theory of generation. 
 The teleomechanical theory denied that a purely mechanical explanation could 
accurately describe embryological development. Thus, philosophers and historians of 
biology often maintain that contemporary molecular genetics must be, in some sense, 
counted among the broad class of theories that were rejected due to the teleomechanical 
assumption that a purely mechanical explanation could not accurately describe 
embryological development (Stanford, 2006, 53). However, some historians and 
philosophers of biology consider the denial of a mechanistic explanation as evidence that 
nineteenth century biologists conceived of this type of explanation as a possible 
alternative. Indeed, as Stanford maintains, “when nineteenth century teleomechanists 
denied that any purely mechanical process could produce the goal-driven phenomena of 
embryological development…there is surely some sense in which contemporary 
molecular genetics (and its purely mechanical account of ontogeny) must be counted 
among the broad class of theories thereby pre-emptively rejected” (2006, emphasis his, 
53). Thus, even though the eventual alternative was conceived of only in very broad and 
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general terms, the fact that they were not fully considered effectively undermines the 
power of the eliminative inferences that the scientists used. 
 Another example that Stanford discusses is from the eighteenth century. During 
the eighteenth century there was a fundamental theoretical conflict between the 
preformationists and the so-called epigeneticists. The preformationists believed that 
embryos were fully developed in one way or another at the very moment of conception, 
while epigeneticists believed that embryonic parts were produced in stages during 
development. However, as Stanford points out, “it is an historical commonplace that 
without any sophisticated chemistry or grasp of molecular complexity and without the 
benefit of cell theory, neither group could form any concrete conception of how complex 
structures could form sequentially in the developing embryo by purely material 
processes” (emphasis his, 2006, 54). Thus, without a sophisticated cell theory or a 
chemistry, both groups failed to accurately conceive of an alternative mechanistic theory 
for embryonic development. Without these sophisticated auxiliary hypotheses, these two 
groups explained complex organic processes by attributing life to matter itself. When 
Spallanzani conducted an experiment that showed that spontaneous generation was 
impossible, he, according to Stanford, believed that the theory of “preformationism [was] 
supported or even simply established by the experimental demonstration that such 
spontaneous generation does not occur” (2006, 54). The refutation of spontaneous 
generation was taken to be an experiment that justified the elimination of any mechanistic 
explanation of generation. According to Stanford, this eliminative inference from the 
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above mentioned experiment was unjustified and flawed, because no fully developed 
mechanistic explanation was on the table at the time such an experiment was conducted. 
Furthermore, a mechanistic explanation of generation was eventually developed, thereby 
refuting the claims of the eighteenth century biologists and illustrating that these groups 
of scientists failed to conceive of and consider a likely and indeed successful alternative. 
 It was not until the end of the nineteenth century that an interest in developing a 
materialistic or mechanistic explanation for generation and heredity arose. As Stanford 
explains this “dramatic momentum [came] from such converging influences as 
increasingly detailed microscopic observations, the development of cell theory, and 
advances in experimental hybridization” (2006, 60). Each of these developments was 
prompted by Charles Darwin‟s Origin of Species and the questions that it brought about 
concerning the mechanisms of evolution. Darwin himself developed a theory of 
pangenesis in his book Variations of Animals and Plants Under Domestication, this 
theory posited physiological units that Darwin termed “gemmules”. Darwin‟s theory of 
gemmules was published four years after a similar theory by Herbert Spencer, however 
Darwin‟s theory was much more developed than Spencer‟s, which was vague and more 
of a primer than a theory. Thus, as Stanford indicates, “Darwin‟s much more concrete 
and more clearly mechanistic hypothesis of pangenesis would exercise a greater influence 
on subsequent theorizing about generation and inheritance, and it was Darwin‟s theory 
that later theorists of generation would feel obliged to confront and discuss, even if only 
to abuse” (2006, 61). During the time of the development of Darwin‟s pangenesis theory, 
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another alternative remained unnoticed and unappreciated. 
 This alternative concerned “Mendel‟s discovery of the ratios with which parental 
traits reappear in subsequent generations of hybrid offspring and their suggestive 
implications concerning the mechanism of heredity” (Stanford, 2006, 61). The paper 
describing this discovery was published in the journal of the Brno Natural History 
Society, however it lay largely unknown on the shelves of libraries all across Europe. 
Mendel‟s discovery was the foundation for the theory of genetics that emerged in the late 
nineteenth century, however it lay largely unnoticed by the biologists of the early 
nineteenth century. Carl Nägeli replied to Mendel‟s experimental results simply by 
suggesting to Mendel that he repeat it using Hawkweed, a particular plant utilized by 
Nägeli that ironically does not exhibit the Mendelian segregation of traits (Stanford, 
2006, 61). It was not until Hugo de Vries, Erich von Tschermak and Carl Correns made 
some microscopic observations concerning chromosomal behaviour which confirmed 
Mendel‟s theory of segregation that Mendel‟s ideas got the deserved recognition. Thus, 
as Stanford concludes, “this case constitutes a particularly interesting source of support 
for the problem of unconceived alternatives, as it offers an especially clear testament to 
the inability to even recognize a particular unconceived alternative theoretical 
explanation for which the data, to modern eyes, seem to cry out” (2006, 61-62). The 
support this case offers is made even more evident due to the fact that Darwin was not 
influenced by Mendel‟s discoveries at all. Darwin spent several decades theorizing and 
gathering evidence for his theory of pangenesis, generation and heredity since he started 
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to develop it in 1868. According to Stanford, Darwin believed that the parents of an 
offspring were the first cause of that offspring; he did not consider that the parents and 
the offspring shared a common cause. Darwin maintained that the shared characteristics 
between the offspring and parents were due to some shared tissue that was contributed 
materially to the offspring. However, as Stanford recognizes, the common cause was 
eventually shown to be “the hereditary material found in a shared germ line ultimately 
producing them both” (Stanford, 2006, 68).  
 In conclusion, the case studies which Stanford utilizes in Exceeding Our Grasp, 
illustrate the shortcomings of eliminative inferences within science. Stanford shows that 
biologists often utilize eliminative inferences to choose from a set of theories that is not 
exhaustive. The example from the eighteenth century showed that both the 
preformationists and the epigeneticists failed to conceive of a materialistic alternative 
explanation of generation and embryonic development. Due to their inability to develop 
such an alternative, the eliminative inference that the eighteenth century biologists 
conducted was from a non-exhaustive set of theories. These scientists failed to conceive 
of and develop a theory that would be later accepted as true.  
 Stanford claims that the case study of nineteenth century biology also shows the 
limitations of eliminative inferences. Mendel‟s theory of recessive and dominant genes 
went largely unnoticed by Darwin and his contemporaries and was not considered as a 
possible alternative. This effectively limited the set of theories being considered during 
the eliminative inference between Darwin‟s pangenesis theory and Spencer‟s theory. This 
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example makes Stanford‟s case even stronger, for Mendel‟s theory was precisely the 
theory that came to be accepted once other scientists independently found the required 
evidence. Therefore, as Stanford states, the historical record shows that “we have 
repeatedly failed to conceive of equally well confirmed alternatives to our best theories 
that were sufficiently scientifically serious as to be actually accepted by later scientists 
and scientific communities” (2006, 188). Given that our ancestors have failed to conceive 
of equally well confirmed alternatives to their best theories, there is reason to believe that 
our current theories will suffer the same fate. 
 Furthermore, if we consider the above contemporary examples from Cosmology 
we now have reason to doubt that the theories that are currently underdetermined by the 
evidence, even those not considered by the current work, are an exhaustive set of possible 
alternatives. Consider the example from cosmology concerning the accelerated expansion 
of the universe.  As was mentioned above, the apparent accelerated expansion of the 
universe was an unexpected observation which changed the way we view the universe 
and our place within it. The previous cosmological model depicted the universe as 
expanding or contracting at a slow and universal rate. The observations made in 1998 
drastically challenged and effectively changed this view and now Cosmologists are faced 
with many possible alternatives, the most prevalent being Dark Energy and Radial 
Inhomogeneity. Thus, before 1998 these two theories were unconceived alternatives, they 
were well supported by the evidence available to cosmologists before the 1998 
supernovae observations. The idea of a cosmological constant was first proposed and 
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utilized by Einstein in order to make his equations describe a nonexpanding universe. 
This idea was later dropped due to the observations, made by Hubble, suggesting an 
expanding universe. However, the fact still remains that, like Mendel‟s hypothesis, a 
universe expressing a cosmological constant was first conceived of and then later 
dropped only to be then reinstated many years later. Thus, our view of the universe has 
gone through some drastic changes in the last ten or so years and these changes could 
have been fully anticipated by the scientists of the past, but remained as unconceived 
alternatives. Furthermore, it stands to reason, based on Stanford‟s argument, that the 
theory that will eventually win out, whether it will be radial inhomogeneity or dark 
energy, will then itself at some point come up against an observation that it cannot 
account for. The theory will inevitability be replaced by a new theory that shares a similar 
observational background as its predecessor and thus can be considered an unconceived 
alternative. 
3.3 Arguments against Stanford 
 The majority of available defences of scientific realism in the philosophical 
literature are directed towards the pessimistic induction rather than Stanford‟s new 
induction. However, since both of these inductions are based on the historical record, 
most objections to the pessimistic induction are applicable to the new induction. Stanford 
considers many of these objections within his book and he concludes “that both the 
problem of unconceived alternatives and the pessimistic induction itself survive even the 
best recent efforts to defend realism from the specter of the historical record” (2006, 
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142). For the purposes of this work, I will consider only the most promising objections to 
the new induction, covered by Stanford, and Stanford‟s responses to them. 
Appeals to Maturity 
 The first objection, that Stanford considers, maintains that the historical examples 
used in his case studies are examples of scientific theories that did not make a novel and 
accurate predictions and thus were not mature scientific theories. Thus according to this 
objection these historical examples lacked the successes that our contemporary successful 
scientific theories have and thus these examples can be rejected. For example, the 
preformationists and the epigeneticists theories of the eighteenth century by Stanford‟s 
own admission never made any novel predictions. Without enough sophisticated 
chemistry and an understanding of cellular generation, neither the preformationists nor 
the epigeneticists could form an accurate understanding of the material processes 
involved in embryonic development (Stanford, 54). Thus the realist maintains that neither 
theory enjoyed any real predictive or explanatory success and were eventually replaced 
by a more sophisticated theory. As biology progressed, the theories that came after the 
preformationists and the epigeneticists theories were exceedingly more successful. 
However, even these theories were eventually rejected, due to their inability at predicting 
further evidence. For example, as we saw above, Darwin‟s theory maintained that the 
only source of change in an organism was the environment; it did not predict the 
existence of dominate and recessive genes and therefore was not a successful theory (see 
Stanford, 2006, 60-75). With the rejection of these examples, the Scientific Realist claims 
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that the evidential basis from which any induction can be made becomes extremely 
restricted (Stanford, 2006, 144). 
Stanford‟s reply to appeals to maturity 
 Stanford maintains that “bare appeals to maturity and/or strict standards of 
success threaten to undermine the explanationist defense of realism itself” (Stanford, his 
italics, 2006, 144). By the explanationist defense Stanford means the very argument that 
scientific realism hinges upon the no miracle argument. The no miracle argument, and 
thus scientific realism, maintains that the success of our theories is best explained by the 
truth or at least approximate truth of those theories. The scientific theories of the past, 
including the theories that are used to support the pessimistic induction and the new 
induction, were held to be true or at least approximately true by the scientists of the 
appropriate era. Thus, according to Stanford, it now seems as though scientific realism 
ought to include further conditions that will explain the explanatory power of our 
successful theories. Therefore, Stanford concludes, “if we now insist that further 
conditions must be satisfied in order to trigger this explanatory demand, we will need a 
principled rationale for why just that sort of success remains a reliable indicator of the 
truth of the theories that enjoy it, when others that equally excited our initial admiration 
and credence failed to do so” (2006, 144). 
 Furthermore, Stanford argues that appeals to maturity also run the risk of being 
circular and tautological. If the criterion of a mature theory is one that involves that 
theory adhering to certain properties that our current successful theories have, then 
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appeals to maturity presuppose scientific realism in order to support scientific realism. 
The only account of maturity that Stanford considers is from Boyd who suggests that 
mature science begins at “what one might call a „take-off point‟, a point in the 
development of the relevant scientific discipline at which the scientific theories are 
sufficiently approximately true and comprehensive” (Boyd, 1980, 627). Before such a 
point is reached, the scientific theories will not possess the degree of reliability that is 
characteristic of science and thus can be characterized as pre-scientific. Thus, Boyd‟s 
definition of a mature science is far too dependent on the scientific realist claim that our 
current successful theories are approximately true and so Stanford concludes that any 
appeal to maturity needs to be based on an objective standard; a standard that does not 
presuppose scientific realism. 
 Even if such an objective standard can be defined, Stanford maintains that 
attempts to undermine the significance of some of the historical examples only works to 
limit the historical challenge that the inductions offer. Even the most severe critics of the 
inductions acknowledge that some of the historical theories were mature or at least 
successful enough that the supporters of them were justified to support it. He considers 
the nineteenth-century wave theory of light which regarded light to consist of a wave 
motion propagated in a medium called the ether, a rarefied elastic material substance. The 
wave theory of light generated many empirical successes, including being able to explain 
and predict the phenomena of reflection, refraction and polarization. Furthermore, the 
wave theory also managed to deal with a reductio ad absurdum derived by Poisson to 
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show that the wave theory was incorrect. As Stanford explains this reductio predicted 
“that there should be a bright spot of light at the center of the shadow of a perfectly 
circular disk” (2006, 146) a prediction which was rather counter intuitive, but was later 
confirmed by experiment. These successes suggested that the nineteenth century wave 
theory of light was indeed true however it was later shown to be false. Therefore, 
Stanford concludes that “past theories that at one time enjoyed the kinds of empirical 
support that have traditionally led their defenders to suppose that they must be 
true…have nonetheless ultimately turned out to be false” (2006, 146). Thus, Stanford 
claims that even though scientific realists are justified in their rejection of some of the 
historical examples used by his new induction, there are enough historical examples of 
the kind needed by these inductions for them to be successful. 
Hardin and Rosenberg‟s Response 
One realist strategy against the new induction is to maintain that it underestimates 
the degree to which the central terms of the now unsuccessful theories refer to objects in 
the world and the extent to which these theories should be judged by present lights. Thus, 
Hardin and Rosenberg argue that past theories need not have been descriptively accurate 
in order for their central terms to refer to real objects in the world. For example, Hardin 
and Rosenberg claim that even though the nineteenth-century wave theory of light 
described light as a wave that is permeated through the ether, the terms „light wave‟ and 
‟ether‟ still referred to something real in the world. The realist is justified to hold as 
Hardin and Rosenberg maintain “that „ether‟ referred to the electromagnetic field all 
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along” (1982, 613-14). Thus, since the central terms of our past theories were indeed 
referential, it follows that the central terms of our current most successful theories will 
also turn out to be referential, thus we can be scientific realists about the objects those 
central terms refer to. 
 Stanford maintains that this strategy only manages to salvage scientific realism in 
part, because it shows that the central terms refer, but does not show that the descriptions 
are accurate. More precisely he maintains that “the sort of account envisioned by Hardin 
and Rosenberg secures a history of successful reference for terms in discarded theories 
only by explicitly divorcing their reference from the question of the accuracy of those 
theories and thus abandoning the specifically theoretical beliefs of the very sort for which 
the realist hopes to convince us to share her realism in the case of current theories” (2006, 
148). Thus, since the central terms of the theories of the past were accurate only in so far 
as they referred to objects in the world and the theories did not provide accurate 
descriptions, we cannot be realists about the descriptions of the unobservables that our 
current successful theories provide. Therefore, according to Stanford, even if Hardin and 
Rosenberg show that the terms in our successful theories are referential, they fail to show 
that our theories theoretical descriptions are also accurate (Stanford, 2006, 149). 
3.4 Structural Realism and the Optimistic Induction 
 In “Structural Realism: The Best of Both Worlds?” John Worrall says that Hardin 
and Rosenberg‟s claim that Fresnel was talking about the electromagnetic field all along 
is far too chartable: Worrall states that “for a historian to reserve the option of holding 
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that a scientist did not fully understand his own theory; but to allow that he may have 
totally misunderstood it and indeed that it could not really be understood until some fifty 
years after his death…is surely taking „rational reconstruction‟ too far” (1989, 117). In 
the nineteenth century, Fresnel described light as an elastic vibration through a solid 
called the ether, he was not mistaking the electromagnetic field for the ether, but was 
describing a substance which he believed existed. That being said, Worrall does believe 
that an element was carried over in the shift from Fresnel‟s theory of light to Maxwell‟s 
theory of light, but that “it was rather less than a carrying over of the full theoretical 
content or full theoretical mechanisms (even in „approximate‟ form‟)” (1989, 117). What 
was carried over in the shift, according to Worrall, was the structure or form of Fresnel‟s 
theory of light. Even though Fresnel misunderstood the nature of light the change from 
his theory to Maxwell‟s shows that he understood the form or structure of light. This 
view leads Worrall to support and reconceptualise structural scientific realism. I will 
move to consider structural scientific realism before moving to consider how Fresnel‟s 
structural claims were carried over to the electromagnetic theory of light and what this 
means for the problem of unconceived alternatives. 
Structural Realism 
 While scientific realism is defined as the philosophical view that maintains that 
we know that our most successful scientific theories are approximately true, structural 
realism maintains that “it is reasonable to believe that our successful theories are 
(approximately) structurally correct” (Worrall, 2007, 125). Thus, structural realism gives 
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a definition of approximate truth in that it states that the structural claims of a scientific 
theory are true. By the structural claims of a scientific theory the structural realist means 
the interactions or relations between entities as predicted or described within a scientific 
theory. Steven French and James Ladyman define structure as “model independent 
relations between phenomena…these relations are not supervenient on the properties of 
unobservable objects and the external relations between them” (2003, 46). 
The Optimistic Induction 
 In support of structural realism, philosophers such as Worrall and McArthur 
construct an optimistic induction in answer to Stanford‟s new induction. One such 
optimistic induction concerns the change from Fresnel‟s theory of light to Maxwell‟s 
theory of light. These two theories are, according to the antirealist, incommensurable, 
meaning the descriptions of nature provided by both theories are distinct and as we have 
seen Stanford utilizes this case to support his new induction. Worrall, however, says that 
the structure of light was carried over from the nineteenth century theory of light to 
Maxwell‟s theory of light. By this he means that the equations describing the relationship 
between light and the objects in the universe were carried forward. As Stanford points out 
in his discussion of Hardin and Rosenberg, the nineteenth century theory of light was 
predictively accurate in that it predicted and later confirmed that light shone onto an 
opaque disc creates a light spot in the middle of the shadow of that disc. Since this 
prediction was later confirmed by experiment, the theory that would later replace 
Fresnel‟s theory, Maxwell‟s theory, would have to be able to explain this phenomenon 
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just as well. In order to do this, Maxwell‟s theory had to incorporate the equations of 
Fresnel‟s theory. Furthermore, according to Worrall, Fresnel‟s theory accurately 
described the structure of light in two other relations, reflection and refraction off a metal 
disc on a ninety degree angle, he explains that: 
 “Letting I2, R2, C2 be the intensities of the components polarised in the 
plane of reflection of the incident, reflected and refracted beams 
respectively and I‟2, R‟2, X‟2, the intensities of the components polarised at 
right angles to the plan of reflection of the incident, reflected and refracted 
beams respectively, then Fresnel‟s equations state that these variables will 
always be related by  
  R/I = tan(i-r)/tan(i+r) R‟/I‟ = sin(i-r)/sin(i+r) 
  X/I = (2sinr.cosi)/(sin(i+r)cos(i-r) X‟/I‟ = 2sinr.cosi/sin(i+r) 
 Where i remember is the angle at which the light is incident on the glass 
(and therefore also reflected from it) while r is the angle at which the light is 
refracted into the glass” (2007, 134). 
 
According to Worrall, other than a reinterpretation of the variables involved, these 
equations are retained entirely within Maxwell‟s theory of light. The difference between 
the two theories is one of how they understand the nature of light. In Fresnel‟s theory, the 
variables I, R, X, I‟, R‟ and X‟ measure the maximum distance that a wave displaces a 
particle of the ether, while in Maxwell‟s mature theory those variables measure the 
variations in the strength of the electromagnetic field. From our point of view then, 
Worrall continues, Fresnel was wrong about the nature of light, a wave displacing an 
elastic medium and yet he was correct in terms of structure for he was correct “that 
optical effects depend on something or other that oscillates at right angles to the direction 
of transmission of the light” (2007, 134). Thus, even though Fresnel had the nature of 
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light incorrect, he was correct, according to our relative position in the history of science, 
in his observations and the equations he used to describe those observations. He observed 
that light reflects off an object at a right angle to the point in which it is transmitted and 
developed equations to describe this relation. Maxwell in developing his theory of light, 
retained Fresnel‟s correct equations, but abandoned Fresnel‟s description of the nature of 
light as a wave traveling through an elastic medium, replacing this description with one 
involving variations in the electromagnetic field. Furthermore, as Dan McArthur 
explains, “this is also the case with the shift from Maxwell‟s theory to modern quantum 
mechanical theories of light, where Fresnel‟s equations still hold as limiting cases” (2008, 
16). 
 Another example of structure being carried over from one theory to another, as 
Dan MacArthur maintains, “is the case of Kepler‟s equations describing planetary motion 
that survive in Newton‟s much more comprehensive theory of universal gravitation. 
These equations express the „interaction properties‟ whereby we can predict planetary 
motion” (2008, 15). Even though these two theories make very different ontological 
claims, claims about the nature of the universe, the structural claims of the theories, the 
way they describe and predict planetary motion, are the same. In fact, the ontological 
claims are so different that Stanford would count the change from Kepler‟s theory to 
Newton‟s theory as evidence for his unconceived alternatives thesis. Therefore, the 
interaction properties of both these theories represent stable structure that persists across 
theory change. This stable structure also persists across the change from Newtonian 
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mechanics to Einsteinian mechanics.  
 Furthermore as Worrall explains, Newtonian mechanics is a limiting case of 
Einstein‟s theory of relativity. He claims that “Newton‟s theory, for example, although 
„rejected‟ (i.e. no longer regarded as the best available theory) continues to be applied to 
slow moving bodies…” (1982, 206). Whenever the velocity of an object is significantly 
lower than the speed of light, the predictions of the theory of relatively are empirically 
indistinguishable from Newtonian mechanics. Thus, even though Newtonian mechanics 
has been superseded by Einsteinian mechanics, some structural claims of Newtonian 
mechanics, i.e. the equations describing the movement of objects at relatively low 
velocities, are still accurate for some cases. 
The Optimistic Induction 
 What all this means for Stanford‟s argument from unconceived alternatives is that 
even though Maxwell‟s theory of light might eventually be replaced by a new emerging 
theory as the history of science shows, the history of science also shows that the structure 
of the theory might be retained. The latter point is what Worrall and other structural 
realists call the optimistic induction. As was shown, further support for this argument 
comes from several other case studies from physics, including the retention of structure 
from Kepler‟s theory of planetary movement to Newton‟s and later Einstein‟s theory. 
Secondly, it has been pointed out that Newtonian mechanics is a limiting case of 
Einstein‟s theory of relativity. As was explained, if an object is moving at a relatively low 
velocity, Newtonian mechanics still holds and the predictions made are identical to those 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
76 
 
 
made by the theory of relativity. Thus, the optimistic induction shows that structure is 
sometimes carried forward from one theory to another and by induction, since structural 
claims have been carried over from previous theories to superseding theories the 
structural claims that our current theories will be carried over into future theories that are 
currently unconceived. Before we move to consider Stanford‟s objections to structural 
realism, we must move to consider Worrall‟s definition of maturity which will provide an 
objective account of mature theories. This definition of maturity enables the structural 
realist to deny some of the case studies that the pessimistic induction and the argument 
from unconceived alternatives utilize. 
 According to Worrall the best definition of a mature theory in science is one that 
is independent and objective. Worrall defines a mature theory as one that has enjoyed or 
does enjoy genuine predicative success (1989, 113). Based on this definition it is clear 
why Worrall, McArthur and other structural realists have focused on the specific cases 
while constructing the optimistic induction. For example, since Fresnel‟s theory of light 
was predictively successful, in that it predicted that a light spot would appear in the 
middle of the shadow produced when light was shown through an opaque disc, it must be 
shown that its structural claims have been carried over into the superseding theory. Thus, 
a structuralist account of the change from Fresnel‟s theory of light to Maxwell‟s was 
needed. Since Newton‟s theory was predictively successful a structuralist account of the 
change from Newtonian mechanics to the theory of relativity was also needed. 
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3.5 Objections to Structural Realism 
Galton‟s Stirp Theory: a counter example 
 However, even with this definition of maturity, the structural realist still faces 
some of Stanford‟s case studies from biology. One such case study that Stanford 
discusses during his criticism of Worrall‟s formulation of structural realism is Galton‟s 
stirp theory of genetics
12. Galton‟s theory, according to Stanford, was a predictively 
successful „mathematical formalization‟ of inheritance and yet it has been abandoned in 
contemporary genetics. Thus, Stanford argues, if structure is mathematical formalizations 
then Galton‟s mathematical formalization of the law of inheritance would count as a 
structural claim. In order for this objection to be applicable to the definition of structure 
given by structural realists since 2006, we can add that Galton‟s mathematical 
formalization also describes the structural relations between the unobservable entities that 
came to be called genes. In other words, the structure he described should be carried over 
into contemporary genetics. According to the law of inheritance, which Galton called the 
ancestral law, two parents contribute one-half of the total heritage of the offspring, 
grandparents contribute one-eighth and so on. Now Stanford admits that “the formal 
mathematical relationship described by the Ancestral law can certainly be unearthed by 
significantly persistent digging” into contemporary genetics (2006, 182), however, he 
also claims that it is equally true that contemporary genetics does not utilize Galton‟s 
Ancestral Law. Contemporary genetics does not describe any fundamental aspects of the 
                                                          
12
 The word stirp comes from the Latin for roots 
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mathematical structure of inheritance. Thus Galton‟s stirp theory, according to Stanford, 
is a counter example to structural realism, for it makes a structural claim that is not 
carried forward into the superseding theory. 
Objections to Stanford‟s counter example 
 Based on Stanford‟s discussion of the stirp theory, it is not entirely clear that 
Galton‟s theory was successful or even widely accepted within the scientific community, 
thus it is questionable whether or not this particular case study counts as a counter 
example to the structural realist optimistic induction. By Stanford‟s own admission, 
Galton believed his theory was incomplete. Indeed, Stanford points out that in his 
discussion of the stirp theory “Galton allows that in the case of heredity we are quite 
ignorant about many aspects of the corresponding „elections,‟ including the stirpal 
analogues of the „numbers of electors,‟ their „qualifications,‟ their „motives,‟ the „number 
of seats,‟… and any number of further details…” (2006, 92). Furthermore, Stanford says 
nothing about how the other biologists of the time viewed Galton‟s theory. This is an 
important omission because the argument from unconceived alternatives must use 
scientific theories that were once held to be true, but were eventually replaced by other 
theories which could have been just as easily developed from the evidence that supported 
the later accepted theory. Stanford also does not include a discussion of the predictive 
success of Galton‟s theory he only mentions that Galton‟s theory was predictively 
successful when he addresses structural realism. Therefore, since Galton himself 
questioned the accuracy of the stirp theory and it did not have any mentionable support 
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from other biologists, this particular theory is not support for unconceived alternatives, 
nor does it count as a counter example to the optimistic induction. Of course, the 
rejection of Galton‟s stirp theory from the set of case studies that support the argument 
from unconceived alternatives is what Stanford would call a Pyrrhic victory for the 
realist, for many other case studies stand in support of the argument from unconceived 
alternatives, it is simply a matter of finding them. 
 Even if we were to suppose that Galton‟s theory was indeed predictive and 
successful, Stanford‟s claim that the ancestral law not is utilized within contemporary 
genetics does not rule out the possibility that the law is a limiting case of contemporary 
genetics. Indeed, his discussion gives evidence that Galton‟s mathematical formulization 
has been carried forward into contemporary genetics as a limiting case. Stanford accepts 
that the law of ancestral heredity still remains as a mathematical formalization of a very 
simplistic level of heredity and can still predict the distribution of genetically defined 
characteristics in particular breeding populations (2006, 182). Stanford‟s objection is that 
this law does not describe any fundamental or significant aspect of heredity. This 
relationship between Galton‟s stirp theory and contemporary genetics ought to seem 
familiar. In his discussion of the change from Newtonian Mechanics to Einstein‟s theory 
of special relativity, Worrall explains that Newton‟s equations of motion are still correct 
when applied to relatively low velocities, velocities that are far lower than the speed of 
light, but when applied to higher velocities Newton‟s equations fail. Worrall concludes 
that Newton‟s equations can be considered as a limiting case of the theory of special 
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relativity. Therefore, if we can accept that Newton‟s equation of motion is a limiting case 
of the theory of special relativity, we can also accept, based on Stanford‟s discussion, that 
Galton‟s law of inheritance is a limiting case of contemporary genetics. 
Answering the charge of atypicality 
 In “Miracles and Models” Worrall admits that the theory shift from Fresnel to  
Maxwell is unrepresentative of the whole of the history of science. To this charge he 
answers that “in all other cases, the best that can be argued is that, once a science has 
reached maturity, the mathematics of any theory replaced in a „scientific revolution‟, 
while not retained fully intact, is instead „quasi-retained‟ modulo the „correspondence 
principle‟” (emphasis his, 2007, 142). As we have seen a means of quasi-retaining the 
structural elements of a theory is by utilizing the theory as a limiting case. Since 
Newtonian mechanics can be used to predict the motion of an object at a relatively low 
velocity in a manner that is equivalent to the special theory of relativity, Newtonian 
mechanics is a limiting case of the special theory of relativity. Furthermore, since the law 
of ancestry of Galton‟s stirp theory accurately describes the distribution of genetic 
characteristics for certain populations, it can be considered as a limiting case of 
contemporary genetics. 
 In conclusion, Stanford‟s counter example to structural realism‟s optimistic 
induction fails for he is incorrect when he states that Galton‟s law of ancestry was not 
carried over into contemporary genetics. Galton‟s law can be understood as a limiting 
case of contemporary genetics. It can still be used to accurately describe the distribution 
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of genes within certain populations. Secondly, Worrall accepts the charge that the case 
study from optics is atypical, but he affirms that even when the structural claims of a 
theory are not retained within the superseding theory, they are still quasi-retained. Indeed, 
the above argument against Stanford‟s counterexample supports Worrall‟s claim of 
quasi-retention, for when structural claims are not fully retained within the superseding 
theory, they are often retained as limiting cases. For example, the structural claims of 
Galton‟s stirp theory is still applicable to certain populations and Newtonian mechanics is 
still applicable to objects traveling at low velocities. 
What Structures are Correct? 
 Another criticism that Stanford makes against structural realism is that the 
structural claims of a theory are elusive and often very difficult to separate from 
ontological claims. As he states, “it is not at all clear that we can plausibly distinguish the 
claims of a theory about the structure of natural phenomenon from its „content‟, 
„ontology‟ or claims about the nature of the entities it describes” (2006, 181). 
Furthermore, Stanford argues that structural realism needs to provide a means of 
identifying the structural claims that will be carried over. Without this criterion the 
structural realist defence fails, for without it the realist cannot know what claims are 
correct. Thus, according to this argument, the assertion that the structural claims of a 
theory are correct is just as ambiguous as the traditional realist position that scientific 
theories are approximately true. 
What we can know to be true 
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 Structural Realism shows that the structural claims of certain mature theories, for 
example Fresnel‟s optics, and Kepler‟s laws of motion, have been carried over into their 
superseding theories, and that by induction, we can be confident that these same 
structural claims will be preserved when or if our current theories are eventually replaced 
by more accurate theories. Thus one way of telling which structures will be carried over 
is through the historical analysis of science. Of course even with this in hand, we will be 
unable to determine which newly devised structural claims of our current theories are 
correct and will be carried over, however the lack of such knowledge does not pose a 
significant problem for the optimistic induction of structural realism.  
 By asking what new structural claims will be carried over from our current theory 
to the next, Stanford is simply pointing out an inherent weakness with inductions. An 
induction only allows for a generalization, it does not allow for specific conclusions. Just 
as Stanford asks the structural realist to be more specific about what structural claims will 
be carried over, the structural realist can ask Stanford which theories will eventually be 
replaced by a currently unconceived alternative. The only difference between these two 
inductive arguments is that Stanford‟s argument is far more overarching than Worrall‟s. 
Stanford claims that all the major theorists within contemporary science have failed to 
conceive of the alternatives that eventually replace the dominant theories, while Worrall‟s 
induction claims that some structural claims within contemporary theories will be carried 
over into the next superseding theories. The weakness of Stanford‟s induction is that an 
optimist can still maintain that some, or at the very least one of our contemporary theories 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
83 
 
 
will not be falsified eventually, while the weakness inherent in Worrall‟s induction is that 
the pessimist can still maintain that no structural claims within our contemporary 
scientific theories will be carried over. However, even with these criticisms both 
inductions still stand. 
 Structural realism is the most promising realist strategy for dealing with the 
problem of unconceived alternatives. It is the only realist strategy that provides an 
optimistic induction that counters the pessimistic induction inherent in Stanford‟s 
argument from underdetermination. What is required in order to fully utilize this realist 
strategy is further research into the history of science in order to find more case studies 
that support the optimistic induction. 
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Ch. 4 Conclusions 
 In chapter one a distinction was made between arguments from global sceptical 
underdetermination, global scientific underdetermination and local underdetermination. 
Arguments from global sceptical underdetermination are designed to call into question all 
knowledge, even knowledge of the self and the world around us. However, it was shown 
that these arguments do not effectively call into question scientific knowledge, for even if 
we humans are being deceived by some evil demon, we can still gain knowledge of the 
world that the demon has created and apply it to the system. Secondly, if the imagination 
of the demon is limited, the knowledge we gain from inside the system could be applied 
to the outer world, the world of the demon. Thus global sceptical arguments are of 
philosophical interest only they do not call into question scientific knowledge. As we saw 
arguments from what I call global scientific underdetermination are aimed at the short 
comings of specific types of knowledge and are thus not fully sceptical. As we saw in 
chapter one, John Earman‟s underdetermination argument based on our inability to 
determine the topological structures of space-time is an argument from global scientific 
underdetermination, because no amount of evidence that we can gather would be able to 
distinguish between the various theories of topological structures allowed by the theory 
of relativity. However, even with this inherent limitation in the theory of relativity, we 
can and have still gained knowledge from the theory itself. Thus, just as we can gain 
knowledge from within the system created by an evil demon, given the inherent 
limitations within a scientific theory, we can still gain knowledge from within that 
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boundary. In other words, even if we cannot gain knowledge about the topological 
features of space-time, we can still gain knowledge about the universe, such as the degree 
to which the light from a distant star gets bent by the sun‟s gravity. Lastly, we saw that 
local underdetermination involves two or more theories that are in principle eventually 
distinguishable, for example Newtonian mechanics and Einstein‟s theory of relativity 
were at one time underdetermined, however the eclipse experiment of 1919 allowed 
physicists to verify the theory of relativity and falsify Newtonian Mechanics. 
 In the last section of chapter one a new general argument from local 
underdetermination was constructed that showed that local underdetermination is a 
possible problem for scientific realism. This argument states that when a scientific theory 
comes up against an anomalous observation that it cannot explain, new theories are 
developed to explain this unexpected phenomenon. These new theories are 
underdetermined, because the only available evidence is the anomalous observation and 
the evidence of the old theory. Now given enough time these will be distinguished 
however until that time we cannot be realists about either theory and therefore traditional 
scientific realism fails. 
 In chapter two we examined how scientists distinguish between two or more 
underdetermined theories and found that they do so by attempting to find independent 
evidence for one of the underdetermined theories or by testing the auxiliary hypotheses of 
one of the theories. We then entertained the possibility that the temporal objection would 
work against our defense of scientific realism. The temporal objection states that even 
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though issues of local underdetermination are resolved empirically, this resolution takes 
time and that until the issue is resolved, we cannot be realists about either theory. 
However, through a consideration of an analogy between scientific realism and murder 
realism, a new version of scientific realism was developed that maintained that we can 
eventually determine when our scientific theories are true. Since, local 
underdetermination is resolved empirically, the new general argument calls into question 
traditional scientific realism but not the above formulation of scientific realism. 
 Chapter three began with a discussion of the second major problem for scientific 
realism, Stanford‟s argument from unconceived alternatives. In Exceeding our Grasp 
Stanford establishes that the history of science shows that past scientists have been 
unable to conceive of all the possible scientific theories to explain a given phenomenon 
and, as a result, their theories, once head to be true, were later shown to be false. He then 
argues that, by induction, we are currently in the same situation; our current theories will 
eventually be shown to be false and replaced by the same scientific theories that could be 
developed based on the empirical evidence we currently have and therefore scientific 
realism is false. It was then shown that Stanford‟s argument from unconceived 
alternatives does indeed challenge traditional scientific realism, but does not undermine 
the philosophical position of structural realism. 
Therefore, it has been shown that traditional scientific realism, the view that we 
know that our current scientific theories are true or at least approximately true, is a 
naively optimistic view of science. The new general argument from underdetermination 
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shows that in a case of underdetermination, we are not in a position to confirm or deny 
either theory and so we cannot be traditional realists about any of the theories. This part 
of the new general argument was called the temporal objection. In response to the 
temporal objection, a different scientific realism was identified which maintains that 
science will eventually discover the truth. It was also shown that traditional scientific 
realism is unable to respond to Stanford‟s argument from unconceived alternatives. 
However, the optimistic induction of Worrall‟s structural scientific realism shows that 
some structural claims are carried over from theory to theory, or that at the very least, 
structural claims of past theories are used as limiting cases of the superseding theory. As 
a result structural realism maintains that we know that some structural claims of a 
currently successful theory are true. 
 Structural realism is the most promising realist strategy for dealing with the 
problem of unconceived alternatives. It is the only realist strategy that provides an 
optimistic induction that counters the pessimistic induction inherent in Stanford‟s 
argument from unconceived alternatives. What is required in order to fully utilize this 
realist strategy is further research into the history of science in order to find more case 
studies that support its optimistic induction. Thus, structural realism still has a long way 
to go until it can be maintained that it fully undermines Stanford‟s argument from 
unconceived alternatives. There is a lot of work being done to accomplish this and 
structural realism may be strong enough to fully eliminate such pessimistic inductions as 
the argument from unconceived alternatives. 
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